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ABSTRACT
The implementation of eugenic policies reached its peak during the zo" century
when thousands of people with intellectual disabilities and other "undesirable
qualities" were involuntary sterilized. Although most of the eugenic policies have
been removed, countries such as South Africa, still make legally provision for the
involuntary sterilization of people with intellectual disabilities.
Torbjërn Tannsjë (1998) used the "argument from autonomy" to argue that
involuntary sterilization practices are wrong because it involves compulsion.
According to him, society should never interfere with people's reproductive choices
and people should never be required to qualify for the right to have children. The
aim of this assignment was to systematically assess the "argument from autonomy"
as far as the policy of involuntary sterilization of people with intellectual disabilities is
concerned. To this end, the concept of autonomy and the principle of respect for
autonomy are discussed and applied to the intellectually disabled. It is argued that
autonomy and respect for autonomy are useful concepts to apply to some people
with intellectual disabilities. These individuals should not be automatically assumed
to be incompetent, but their competence needs to be determined on an individual
level, with reference to the complexity of the decision to be made. Special effort is
needed from health care professionals to obtain (where possible) informed consent
from people with intellectual disabilities. The application of the principle of respect
for autonomy to matters of reproduction leads to the conclusion that people with
severe to profound levels of disability, are unable to provide informed consent for
sexual intercourse. Therefore some form of paternalistic protection is needed for
these individuals. People with mild to moderate intellectual disabilities who are
however competent to consent to sexual intercourse should never be prohibited
from procreation by means of involuntary sterilization. State interference in matters
of reproduction should be limited to interventions where (i) children are seriously
harmed by parents and (ii) to protect those who are incompetent to consent to
sexual interactions with others. Apart from these exceptions, the intellectually
disabled is entitled to the same procreative rights as all other citizens.
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OPSOMMING
Die implementering van eugenetiese beleid het gedurende die 20 ste eeu 'n
hoogtepunt bereik met die onwillekeurige sterilisering van duisende persone met
intellektuele gestremdhede en ander "ongewensde kwaliteite". Alhoewel meeste
van die eugenetiese wetgewing verwyder is, maak lande soos Suid-Afrika steeds
wetlik voorsiening vir die onwillekeurige sterilisasie van persone met intellektuele
gestremdhede.
Torbjërn Tannsjo (1998) maak gebruik van die "outonomie argument" om te
argumenteer dat onwillekeurige sterilisasie praktyke onaanvaarbaar is omdat dit
dwang bevat. Hy voer aan dat die samelewing nooit in die reproduktiewe keuses
van mense behoort in te meng nie en dat dit nooit vir mense nodig moet wees om
vir ouerskap te kwalifiseer nie. Die doel van hierdie werkstuk was om sistematies
die "outonomie argument" te analiseer ten opsigte van die beleid van die
onwillekeurige sterilisasie van persone met intellektuele gestremdhede. Met hierdie
doel voor oë word die konsep outonomie en die beginsel van respek vir outonomie
bespreek en toegepas op die intellektueel gestremde persoon. Daar word
aangevoer dat outonomie en respek vir outonomie nuttige beginsels is om in ag te
neem in kwessies rakende intellektueel gestremdes. Hierdie individue moet nie
outomaties as onbevoeg beskou word nie, maar hul bevoegdheid moet eerder op 'n
individuele basis beoordeel word, inaggeneem die kompleksiteit van die besluit wat
geneem moet word. Voorts word daar van gesondheidsorgpersoneel verwag om
moeite te doen met die verkryging van oorwoê toestemming (waar moontlik) by
persone met intellektuele gestremdhede. Die toepassing van die beginsel van
respek vir outonomie op aspekte rakende reproduksie, lei tot die gevolgtrekking dat
persone met ernstige intellektuele gestremdhede nie in staat is om toestemming tot
seksuele omgang te verleen nie. Dus, is 'n vorm van paternalistiese beskerming in
hierdie gevalle aangedui. Persone met intellektuele gestremdhede wat egter wel
bevoeg is om toestemming tot seksuele omgang te verleen, moet nooit weerhou
word van voortplanting deur middel van onwillekeurige sterilisering nie. Inmenging
deur die staat in kwessies rakende reproduksie moet beperk word tot intervensies
waar (i) kinders ernstige skade berokken word en (ii) die beskerming van persone
wat onbevoeg is om toestemming tot seksuele interaksies met ander te verleen,
benodig word. Afgesien hiervan, is die intellektuele gestremde persoon geregtig op
dieselfde reproduktiewe regte as alle ander landsburgers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.1 Introduction
During the 20th century the involuntary sterilization of the intellectually disabled
occurred in the USA, European as well as developing and third world countries as
part of eugenic policies. Since then these policies have been heavily criticized and
removed. Although the eugenic policies have been removed, the involuntary
sterilization of the intellectually disabled still continues worldwide as part of
reproductive health programs. It remains a controversial practice, with numerous
ethical and legal implications, some of which will be discussed in the present
assignment. This chapter gives a brief overview of the ethical/philosophical issues
underlying the practice of sterilization of the intellectually disabled as well as the
focus and outline of the present assignment.
1.2 Problem statement
Ever since the first safe forms of sterilization were introduced during the late 19th/
early 20th century, sterilization as a form of contraception has been both acclaimed
and criticized. Acclaimed by those who favored a safe, long-term contraceptive that
will render them some social and sexual freedom. Criticized by those who view it as
a form of oppression: oppression against women and those who are not able to
consent to voluntary sterilization.
The availability of this new technology led to a period of increased governmental
intrusion in reproductive choices (Areen, 1989:94). For example, the sterilization of
people with intellectual disabilities who were unable to give consent, occurred
increasingly during the 20th century as part of eugenic legislation. These eugenic
practices stemmed mainly from beliefs that intellectual disabilities were hereditary
and that legalised eugenic movements were needed to prevent people with an
intellectual disability to "reproduce more of their own" (Denekens, Nys & Struer,
1999:25; Park & Radford, 1998:318). Countries in which eugenics was practised
include Germany, Sweden, Norway, India, Africa, USA, Peru, etc. (Strauss,
1995:10-11).
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2Following the exposed horrors of Nazi Germany and Sweden, the human rights
movements, and new scientific developments proving that few forms of intellectual
disability is hereditary, a growing disapproval of mandatory sterilization for the
mentally handicapped developed. In 1942 the US Supreme Court declared that
reproduction is a fundamental human right and in 1971 the UN declared that people
with an intellectual disability are entitled to the same human rights as all other
human beings (Denekens et ai, 1999:25). From these premises the conclusion can
easily be drawn that procreation is a basic human right which also applies to the
person with an intellectual disability.
Whereas the eugenic movements were characterized by public and state
interference in matters of procreation, the human rights movements emphasize the
private nature of decisions regarding procreation and reproduction. The tension
between procreation as a private versus a public matter has became a contentious
issue. Although most people will agree that human beings are autonomous and
that their autonomy should be respected in matters of reproduction, the notion of
autonomy and respect for autonomy becomes extremely problematic when applied
to the person with an intellectual disability. Precisely those faculties which make
informed consent and voluntary decision-making possible, are affected by the
disability these people suffer from. Therefore, from a philosophical point of view, it
doesn't necessarily follow that an intellectually disabled person has "personhood"
and that the principle of respect for autonomy can be applied in matters stemming
from reproductive rights. In fact it is often questioned whether they do not have
"marginal personhood" that may exclude them from certain human rights
(Boddington & Podpadec, 1991:178; Spicker, 1990:139).
A myriad reasons supporting or challenging the ethical basis of the involuntary
sterilization of the intellectually disabled, emerged in recent years. Some cited
reasons such as:
• the inability of the intellectually disabled person to make decisions about
procreation,
• the inability of the intellectually disabled person to care for a child,
• the trauma associated with pregnancy and giving birth for the disabled person,
• the disadvantages of long-term contraception to the person's health,
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3• the burdens placed on the family caring for the intellectually disabled and
• managing dysmenorrhea as support to their arguments in favour of sterilization
of the intellectually disabled.
The opposite position is often motivated by arguments such as:
• procreation and personal inviolability are basic human rights,
• sterilization is invasive and permanent,
• people who are intellectually disabled are not necessarily incapable of giving
informed consent
• and to anticipate future "hardship" for the intellectually disabled person or his/her
offspring is difficult to determine since "hardship" is such a subjective term
(Draper, 1991:95-97; Canadian Law Reform Commission, 1983: 1-8).
According to Torbjëm Tannsjo (1998;1999) the compulsory sterilization practices
which occurred in Sweden can be criticized according to three strands of criticisms,
namely the argument from autonomy, the argument from caution and the argument
from biological scepticism.
The argument from autonomy (which is also supported by Tannsjë) regards the
sterilization policy as wrong because it involved compulsion. Society should never
interfere with people's reproductive choices and the legal right to have children
should be absolute - not a right people have to qualify for. This argument implies
that neither the possibility that someone cannot take good care of their children nor
the chance that the child will be born with a serious hereditary disease should be
grounds for compulsory sterilization.
The argument from biological scepticism, does not problematize the fact that
sterilization is compulsorily done nor that people who are not mentally handicapped
are held as such and therefore sterilized, but that the aim of the policy is to avoid
the birth of people with handicap and disease. People who support this view deem
sterilization wrong if it is aimed at avoiding hereditary disease to spread. According
to this view, it is immaterial whether someone consents to it voluntarily or
compulsorily.
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4The argument from caution regards Sweden's policy of compulsory sterilization as
wrong, not because the policy is wrong as such but because the policy has been
abused. This line of thinking presupposes that there are cases in which compulsory
sterilization is in order. It should just be exercised in a responsible manner and
should only be directed at people who are really not capable of taking care of their
children or to prevent the birth of seriously ill or handicapped people. This position
was also taken by the South African legislators in the formulation of the Sterilization
Act of 1998. According to the act, people who cannot consent to sterilization can be
sterilized against their will if a selected panel of experts have made such a
recommendation upon a received application from a caregiver or family member.
The aim of the present assignment is to systematically assess the "argument from
autonomy" with reference to the South African situation as far as the policy of
involuntary sterilization for people with intellectual disability is concerned. In the
process the principle of autonomy and respect for autonomy will be critically
scrutinized as well as the implications of a strict and prima facie adherence to this
principle.
1.3 Outline of present study
The following chapter will give a brief factual and historical overview of sterilization
as a form of contraception as well as a discussion of the ethical problems
associated therewith. A description of the current South African policy in this regard
is also provided. The notion of "intellectual disability" will be discussed in chapter
three by means of a brief historical overview as well as attempts to provide both the
medical/psychological and philosophical perspectives on intellectual disability.
In the fourth and fifth chapters, the concept of autonomy and the principle of respect
for autonomy will be addressed. First a conceptual analysis will be provided
followed by the application thereof to reproductive choices in general. The
sterilization of the mentally handicapped, specifically, will be discussed in chapter
six. Concluding remarks and recommendations will be given in chapter seven.
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CONTRACEPTIVE STERILIZATION
2.1 Introduction
The quest for effective birth control' has been present ever since the beginning of
(wo)mankind. It gained momentum during the late 19th/early zo" centuries when
major advances were made regarding the development of safe and effective
methods of contraceptives. One of the contraceptive methods that were developed
(and which is currently the most popular among women in the United States), is
female and male sterilization. Sterilization is one of the few methods that are
approaching 100% effectiveness and its effectiveness is not influenced by so-called
"user-error". Although this development had the potential to provide women and men
with sexual freedom, it also became the ideal method to limit procreation among
people who were deemed unfit for parenthood. In this chapter an overview of
sterilization as a form of contraception and some of its accompanying ethical
problems, are provided, after which the use of sterilization for eugenic purposes is
discussed. This is followed by an outline of the present sterilization legislation and
the implementation thereof in South Africa.
2.2 Contraception: current practices
The use of mechanical, animal, chemical and plant materials as contraceptives has
been described in ancient documents. For example the papyri of Kahun (1850 BC)
recommended a vaginal suppository, made from crocodile dung or honey, and in
papyri of Ebers (1550 BC) the use of condom-like covers, made from intestines or
skin, were described. During the 16th century Gabriella Fallopio developed the
prototype of the condom in order to prevent the spread of venereal diseases, such as
syphilis, and in the late 19th, early 20th century safe and effective forms of sterilization
were developed (Noonan, 1978:204). During the zo" century various forms of
contraceptives were developed and/or refined of which the following are currently
known and used (Duncan, Dunstan & Wellbourn, 1977:96-97; Knight, 1998:355-365):
I Birth control can be defined as any method used to prevent birth, including contraceptives,
contragestives and chemical or surgical abortion after implantation, whereas contraception
refers to birth control methods that have prevention of conception as their primary birth control
action (Callahan, 1998:335).
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6• Oral contraceptives. "The Pill" was approved by the Food and Drug
Administration of the USA in June 1960 and since then various forms of oral
contraceptives, all containing different combinations of synthetic progestagens
and estrogens, were developed. Their effectiveness in preventing pregnancy
have been proved to be 97-99% with relatively few side effects and health risks.
• Subdermal implants (such as Norplant)
These implants deliver progesterone on a continuous basis, and are highly
effective methods of birth control for a period of at least 5 years. Although it has
been piloted in South Africa it is not considered for widespread use due to
practical limitations.
• Depo-Provera
"The injection" contains injectable progesterone, and is a highly effective form of
birth control for a period of three months. The use of Depo-Provera often (but not
always) results in the cessation of menstruation, which proves to be useful in the
management of menses of women who are intellectually disabled. This method
of contraception has only been used since the early eighties and relatively little is
known about the long-term effects of its use. Some concerns have been raised,
though, that long-term use may result in cardiovascular disease and it has been
associated with breast and uterus cancer in experiments with animals. Although
it has been used widely outside the USA as a contraceptive, the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration has not approved it as a contraceptive, but it is available for
other purposes (Ackerman & Strong, 1989:65).
• Condoms
Male condoms are currently widely used, since it both acts as a contraceptive
and prevents the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases and the HI virus.
It is 97-99% effective as a form of birth control, provided that it is used properly.
Female condoms have also been developed and were recently piloted in South
Africa.
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7• Other
Other contraceptives available, although not commonly used, are the diaphragm,
the cervical cap, the contraceptive sponge, spermicides, intrauterine devices
(IUD) and postcoital contraception (known as the "moming after pili").
• Surgical sterilization
Sterilization can be defined as " any procedure, the primary purpose of which is to
render a person incapable of reproduction" (Duncan et ai, 1977:310; Hellman,
1978:1606). It can take a contraceptive (the intention of permanently removing
reproductive capacity as a means of family planning), therapeutic (performed to
prevent harm resulting from reproduction itself) or eugenic (the intention of
preventing reproduction in those considered to have undesirable genes) function
(Draper 1991:77).
Surgical sterilization is currently the most common form of birth control in the United
States. Worldwide it is calculated that 16% of married women are protected from
pregnancy by tubal ligation. Although there are numerous procedures and
modifications for contraceptive sterilization, they all basically involve the bilateral
cutting, tying, sealing and/or removing of a small part of the fallopian tubes (in
women) and the vas deferens (in men). In order to perform a tubal ligation, electro-
or thermocoagulation, mechanical rings or clips and chemical adhesives may be
used. A tubal ligation (salpingectomy) prevents the ovum and sperm to reach each
other at the necessary site of fertilization in the fallopian tube, whereas a vasectomy
prevents sperm to pass from the epididymis (where it is stored) to the vas deferens.
Tubal ligations and vasectomies are regarded as less intrusive forms of sterilization
since it involves only minor surgical incisions (Duncan et ai, 1977:311-312; Hellman,
1978:1607; Knight, 1998:364).
In contrast hysterectomies (the removal of the uterus), the removal of the ovaries
(oophorectomies) and male castration (orchidectomies) are regarded as more
intrusive sterilization procedures. Oophorectomies involve the surgical removal of
the ovaries and are often referred to as female "castration". This procedure usually
results in the early onset of menopause and consequently has serious health risks.
The lack of estrogen has the cessation of menstruation as a side effect with
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8accompanying hormonal changes and symptoms of hot flashes, depression and a
decrease in bone density which can lead to the early onset of osteoporosis (Park &
Radford, 1998:339).
The male version is called orchidectomy (male "castration") and usually involves the
removal of the testicles. It can serve a double purpose, since the probability of
reproduction is reduced and supposed aggressive sexual behaviour is curtailed
because the level of testosterone is reduced, if not eliminated by the procedure (Park
& Radford, 1998:339). Until the recent past, both oophorectomies and
orchidectomies were commonly performed on people with intellectual disabilities -
often with the onset of puberty. For females, it was an easy solution to problems
associated with menstruation management and for males, it was an easy solution to
problems associated with sexual and aggressive behaviour, making these people
"more controllable" within an institutional environment. According to current
sterilization legislation in South Africa, these operations may only be performed if the
person in question's health is seriously jeopardized if these operations are not
performed. Yet, parents and care givers of children with intellectual disabilities often
request sterilization, thinking (and hoping) that a hysterectomy will be performed and
that their problems with menstruation management will be resolved".
2.3 Ethical problems related to fertility management and sterilization
Birth control and contraception have been and still remain highly complex moral,
legal, religious, political, cultural, class, racial and gender issues within our society.
Areen (1997:105) distinguishes between three historic stages in fertility management
- each accompanied by its own ethical and moral concerns. During the first period,
limiting procreation, also among married couples, was prohibited. Both religious and
secular authorities supported this view. The second stage involved the eugenics
movement during which many people regarded as unsuitable for procreation, were
involuntary sterilized. Thirdly, the period since the 1960's during which the human
rights movements discouraged any state interference with the ihdividual's right to
privacy in matters of reproduction. Concerns about autonomous decision-making
and informed consent became more pronounced during the latter phase.
2 I am indebted to Marie Adamo, Deputy Director, Reproductive Health, Dept of Health for this
information.
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9Throughout the three phases, the social attitudes and the position of the state toward
birth control were tied to various considerations such as sexuality, politics, religion,
economics and the social status of women (Callahan, 1998:336).
2.3.1 Religious and secular views
In ancient times, Jewish scriptures did not explicitly condemn contraception. Yet,
various scriptures emphasize the importance of fertility and the duty of procreation,
ranging from passages such as Genesis 1:27-28 in which God ordered man to
"increase and multiply", to the promise of God in Deuteronomy 7:13 that "no man or
woman among you shall be childless". Genesis 38:8-10 describes how Onan
angered God because he purposefully let his seed "fall to the ground" and therewith
disobeyed his father's orders to impregnate Tamar, the wife of his deceased brother.
Later Jewish thought were divided on the issue of duties to propagate race: some
rabbis recognized that there are certain cases in which a woman may "legitimately
use root potions as a contraceptive". It seems therefore that Jewish thought in
general disfavoured the practice of contraception although it was never explicitly
forbidden in the scriptures (Noonan, 1978:205).
According to Noonan, (1978:206) a specific doctrine on sexuality evolved during
early Christianity, and had the following major themes:
• the superiority of virginity
• the institutional goodness of marriage
• the sacred character of sexual intercourse
• the goodness of procreation and
• the evil of extramarital intercourse and homosexual conduct.
Early Christianity therefore viewed virginity as desirable, but marriage as good.
Within marriage, husbands were expected to "use their wives moderately and only for
the raising up of children" and within this context, contraception was excluded.
Augustine provided a detailed analysis in which he argued that the use of
contraceptives is the enemy of the church. According to his analysis, offspring is one
of the goods of marriage and in order to keep marital intercourse free from sin, the
couple must have "offspring in view". The "mere absence of procreative intent made
marital intercourse venially sinful; positive prevention of procreation tums the bridal
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chamber into a brothel" (as quoted in Noonan, 1978:208). Today the Catholic
Church is still divided on the issue with some members of the papal commission
supporting the use of contraceptives in marriage. Others support the view expressed
by Pope Paul VI in Humanae Vitae where he re-established the position of Pius XI
and XII, namely that contraceptive intent and practice is acceptable for serious
personal and social reasons, but each marital act should otherwise be open to its
procreative purpose (Duncan et aI, 1977:94; Noonan 1978:213).
Early Protestantism echoed the views on contraception formulated by the Roman
Catholic church and this was even more pronounced as these religious counterparts
were in competition for numeric support.
Until 19th century Christian theology developed, both Protestantism and Catholicism
were opposed to contraception - a view also supported by the secular governments.
For example, in 1877 Annie Besant and Charles Bradlagh were prosecuted in Britain
for distributing texts on contraception and in the United States the Comstock law was
passed (in 1873) which forbade the mailing or importation of contraceptives (Noonan,
1978:210). Most American states also forbade the selling and advertising of
contraceptives since contraceptives were associated with promiscuity and the moral
decline of family values. Therefore, despite the scientific advancements, the use and
distribution of effective and safe forms of contraception were met with strong social
resistance (Callahan, 1998:336).
From the last quarter of the 19th century until the 1930's a major shift took place in
terms of the moral acceptance of contraception. This was in part stimulated by the
advancements in science, sociology and economy. Infant mortality rates decreased
and the life expectancy of people increased as social circumstances were improved
and the science of medicine became more vigorous. Concerns were increasingly
voiced on the dangers of overpopulation and the effect it will have on the world's
resources. Therefore, in the West, the use of contraceptives became a solution to
the pressing problem of overpopulation, a substitute for abortion and an aid to
personal happiness. The humanist arguments in favour of contraceptives were
increasingly accepted and after the Second World War the opposition to
contraception gradually disappeared. In efforts to deal with concerns of population
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control, governments revoked certain laws and developed policy in which "family
planning" was actively promoted. (Noonan, 1978:211).
The development of contraceptive technology as well as social and political factors
led to the second phase in fertility management identified by Areen (1997:105),
namely a period of eugenics. During this phase contraception, especially
sterilization, came to be an effective way of dealing with "unwanted" or undesirable
elements in society and to keep them from having more of their own. The period of
eugenic policies started and reached its peak in the early half of the zo" century.
2.3.2 Eugenics
During the 19th century scientific thought in general supported the belief that
important social traits were inherited. Francis Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin, was
the first to express these ideas in modern scientific language, although Plato and
Aristotle have expressed similar ideas (Galton, 1998:266). In his scientific
endeavors, Galton collected family pedigrees to show that "high achievement" ran in
families and by implication so did traits of alcoholism and criminality (Reilly, 1996:1).
The term "eugenics" (derived from the Greek: eu- good, well; gen- genesis, creation),
was also the brainchild of Galton and in 1907 he became the Honorary President of
the English Eugenics Education Society founded in the same year (Galton,
1998:263). The Society concerned itself with "questions bearing on what is termed in
Greek, eugenes, namely good in stock, hereditarily endowed with noble qualities"
(Hubbard & Henifin, 1984:76). Galton's main proposals were: (a) Extensive family
records should be kept and in competitive examinations for professional posts, extra
marks should be awarded for "family merit"; (b) Women from "gifted families" should
be encouraged to get married young and be given financial incentives for having
many children; (c) Rules of celibacy for gifted individuals should be abolished; (d)
The state should take some form of action against the procreation of the feeble-
minded, the insane and some classes of habitual criminals (Galton,1998:266; Galton
& Galton, 1998:101).
This world view was implemented in various western societies from the 1920's
onwards. In the USA it was implemented politically by the eugenic sterilization laws
and the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924. The Supreme Court, in the case Buck
vs Bell (1927) supported these practices when it ruled that the Virginian law passed
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in 1927, which allowed the state to sterilize individuals found to be incompetent, was
constitutional. The view of the majority of the Supreme Court was expressed by the
words of Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes,
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often felt to
be much by those concemed, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the Fallopian tubes three generations of imbeciles are enough
(Smith & PolIoway, 1993:208-209; Strauss, 1995:10).
By 1931, almost 30 states had enacted compulsory sterilization laws that were aimed
at the "feeble-minded" or people with "hereditary defects" such as epileptics,
drunkards, sexual perverts, the insane, rapists and habitual criminals (Duncan et ai,
1977:121). Many of these laws were never enforced, yet by January 1935 some 20
000 people had already been forcibly sterilized and by the 1970's more than 60 000
individuals were sterilized involuntarily in the USA (Park & Radford, 1998:318; Smith
& PolIoway, 1993:209).
These sterilizations often accompanied the institutionalization of people with mental
retardation. Smith and PolIoway (1993) studied the data of 212 individuals who were
sterilized in Virginia and found that those sterilized in institutions were mostly female,
poor and young, that the majority of sterilizations were performed between the ages
of 15 and 24 and that 15,8% of the discharged individuals who did not have
intellectual disabilities, were also sterilized. People who were suitable for placement
outside institutions, such as people with mild or borderline intellectual disabilities,
were more often sterilized than those within the severe-profound range.
Park and Radford (1998) analyzed the files of the eugenics board for the province of
Alberta and found that most sterilizations were seen by the board as a form of
protection and not a form of punishment. In Alberta people were sexually sterilized if
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they were found to be in danger to transmit mental deficiency to their children, or
were regarded as incapable of intelligent parenthood. The reasons cited for
sterilization included:
• mental deficiency;
• the danger of the transmission of the progeny of "mental disability" or "mental
deficiency";
• the danger that the exercise of the power of procreation may involve risk or
mental injury either to the patient or her progeny;
• inability to be "intelligent" parents;
• poor family history of 'mental deficiency';
• nervousness and insanity;
• epileptic hemiplegic imbecility;
• uncontrolled sexual interest and activities;
• elevated risk of pregnancy when returning home for holidays;
• offspring born with physically handicaps (Park & Radford, 1998:325).
Sterilization was often seen as a biological solution for social and behavioural
problems such as behavioural difficulties (abnormal sexual behaviour, destructive
and criminal tendencies), deprivation of family support, parental death, spousal
abandonment, impoverished family background and a precondition to institutional
release (Park & Radford, 1998:327-335).
In Germany eugenic sterilization started during 1933 and within two years almost
56,244 people were judged to be hereditary defective and were consequently
sterilized without consent Although the sterilizations were initially aimed at the
"feebleminded", it was quickly extended to include homosexuals and other
"undesirables". Eugenics quickly escalated from sterilization to euthanasia and
eventually led to the murder of millions of Jews, gypsies and other outcasts. These
excesses eventually contributed to the decline and eradication of eugenic
movements (Hubbard & Henifin, 1984:78; Reilly, 1996:2).
To the surprise of many, eugenics was also practiced in the Scandinavian countries.
In Denmark around 40 000 handicapped people have been sterilized since 1929 and
in Sweden approximately 60 000 handicapped people were sterilized between 1935
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and 1976. The main motivation behind the eugenic movements in Scandinavia was
to remove undesirable people and to save money. "..... sterilization was a cheap and
simple means for reducing the numbers of the socially undesirable and marginalized,
while reducing welfare spending in a time of global economic depression" (Gems,
1999:202). Sterilization was also required as a condition for teenagers to be
released from schools for children with learning difficulties and as a precondition in
order to get an abortion or permission to marry. By 1970 over 170 000
Scandinavians were sterilized as part of these programmes. Although some have
argued that sterilization was never compulsory in the Nordic countries, this argument
creats a false impression. For example, many mentally ill and retarded people
couldn't give or withhold consent. Therefore, as legal incompetents, decisions were
taken on their behalf by relatives and state authorities (Gems, 1999:293).
After the Second World War and the Nazi eugenic movement, the role of genes and
especially recessive genes were increasingly investigated and the nature/nurture
debates surfaced. It became clear, scientifically, that the inheritance of "social traits"
is a very complex process (Hubbard & Henifin, 1984:79).
According to Hubbard and Henifin (1984:77), the importance of the eugenics
movement lies in the fact that it provided scientific justifications for people's social
and economic failures or successes, or in the words of Park and Radford (1998:338):
"eugenic sterilisation was a 'prophylactic measure' designed to curb the procreation
of undesirables while at the same time firmly placing the blame for their disabilities on
the victims or their immediate families". Objections to the 20th century eugenics
movements are that they were authoritarian and based on an inadequate
understanding of human genetics and that they were infringements on the
individual's privacy regarding reproductive matters (Lappé, 1978: 462). Some writers
suggest that the principle of doing no harm should preclude any attempt at genetic
intervention that might generate unintentional harms and that socio-economic factors
which are strongly associated with increased incidences of birth defects or reduced
scores on IQ tests, should be addressed.
The increased genetic knowledge which makes the ability to predict the
consequences of reproductive behaviour more accurate, brings two ethical traditions
into conflict. The one assigns a high value to autonomy and self-determination in
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decision-making, while the other imbues individuals with a sense of duty to act for the
common good. Some argue that society does not have an unmitigated right to
interfere and intervene in the reproductive behaviour of the individual. Others feel
that the state has an obligation to educate and instruct in matters affecting
reproduction, since society has the implicit obligation to future generations to at least
not leave them worse off genetically (Lappé, 1978: 466).
Tannsjó (1998:238-239) provides a summary of the three main strands of criticism
that were raised against the eugenic sterilization policies of Sweden. According to
the argument from autonomy the sterilization policy was wrong because reproductive
matters are private and should never be interfered with by society. People (including
people with intellectual disabilities) should never have to qualify for the right to have
children. If parents fail to take adequate responsibility for the upbringing of their
children, society should act and take custody of the children or assist and support the
parents.
The argument from caution regards the sterilization policies as wrong because it
wasn't conducted carefully. It was based on bad science and was conducted in a
rash and careless manner. This approach does not regard compulsory sterilization
as intrinsically wrong, but argues that if it is undertaken, it must be aimed at peopte
who are really not capable of taking care of their children or should only be
undertaken to prevent the birth of seriously ill or handicapped people.
Thirdly, Tannsjë (1998:239) describes the argument from biological scepticism
according to which the sterilization policies were wrong because they tried to avoid
the birth of people with handicap and illness. The more radical version holds that
handicaps should not be cured even if cures exist, since it is a good thing that society
has to adapt to the needs of groups with special needs. In the less radical version,
handicap and illness are regarded as problematic, and if possible, should be cured.
Yet, it is not morally permissible to see to it that healthy children, rather than ill or
handicapped children, are born. This implies that sterilization, in order to avoid the
spread of hereditary disease, is wrong, regardless of whether it was done
compulsorily or voluntarily.
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Whichever of the three arguments one uses to criticize eugenic programmes, it has
important implications for future policies in this regard. In South Africa, the current
legislation is supportive of the "argument from caution" - it makes provision for the
sterilization of the intellectually disabled, but also has stringent control mechanisms
in place to safeguard against the abuse thereof.
2.3.3 Current ethical concerns
Since the Human Rights Movements and the so-called "sexual revolution" of the
1960's, contraceptives were more readily available and more widely accepted.
Consequently the ethical concerns about sterilization shifted towards the role of
gender, race and class issues in sterilization programs and questions about the
individual's right to self-determination and autonomous decision-making.
In South Africa the so-called triple oppression in terms of race, class and gender,
was especially pronounced during the "Apartheid" years, also in the way
contraceptives were marketed, distributed and sometimes given without obtaining
proper informed consent. Family planning and birth control technology was often
used in the service of ideological motives. Contraceptives were actively promoted
among black and poor women in order to limit population growth among the non-
whites, while white women were given incentives (such as tax alleviation) to have
more children. There were also many reports of black lower class women who have
been involuntary sterilized, when they had caesarian sections (Department of Health,
Policy document for reproductive health, 3rd Draft). These practices are not unique to
South Africa, but is reported to happen in various developing countries such as
China, India and Peru where sterilization is actively promoted among women in order
to curtail population growth. In these countries women are often coerced, forced or
rewarded if they undergo sterilization while the health care staff are rewarded if
certain targets are met (Duncan et aI, 1977:313).
in Peru, for example, it has been estimated that more than 100 000 women were
sterilized between July 1995 to November 1997 as part of a sterilization campaign
(supported by USA funding). Although not all of the sterilizations were involuntary,
many women were enticed to accept the procedure with promises of free food or
money. Peruvian health care workers were also given "credits" for meeting the
sterilization targets. Human rights leaders in Peru have criticized these programs for
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targeting the poor, the illiterate and the young (The Miami Herald, 11/01/1998; The
Wanderer,05/05/1998; The New York Times, 15/02/1998).
According to Draper (1991:79-80) more sterilizations are performed among the lower
classes and these are usually performed at a much younger age than the upper
classes. Among the upper classes, more vasectomies are performed and in general
sterilizations are done at a later age. These findings were also supported by a survey
conducted among American Obstetricians, finding that only 6% of the respondents
favoured sterilization for private patients, while 14% favoured it for their welfare
patients. Another study also found that 43% of women sterilized in federally financed
family planning programs, were black (Hubbard & Henifin, 1984:80).
Some fetal protection policies in the USA also require women to provide evidence
that they have been sterilized before they can be appointed in certain positions.
These jobs usually involve exposure to toxins, which could endanger the healthy
development of the fetus. Not surprisingly, these jobs are usually also the best-paid
jobs in the industry (Callahan, 1998:349).
It seems therefore, that it is often the powerless, such as women, the poor and the
disabled, who are most at risk for being coerced or forced to undergo sterilizations
(Rock, 1996:123). To borrow a quote from Hubbard & Henifin (1984:74), "our society
is not one in which power and knowledge are equally distributed among all segments
of the population. On the contrary, physicians are more powerful than the great
majority of their patients - and not because they know more about the disease, but
because they usually are members ofa more privileged race, class and gender .... ",
Although the principle of autonomy guides many health care decisions in the western
world, asymmetrical power relationships between medical staff and the consumers
still exist. The challenge seems to lie partly in the problem of obtaining informed
consent from the poor and the poorly educated. Doctors often find it easier, quicker
and more convenient to make paternalistic decisions on behalf of their patients than
to go through the long and often cumbersome process of obtaining proper informed
consent from people with limited knowledge and education (Draper, 1991 :81-82).
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But what about women who are educated, informed and able to give consent?
Should they be allowed to undergo sterilizations just because they wish to have the
procedure performed? Take for example the hypothetical case presented by Basson
(1981:135) where Elizabeth Stanley, a healthy 26 year old intern medical student
requested a tubal ligation. After having thought about it for a long time she was
convinced that she would never want to have children. She has never been pregnant
and is not interested in other available contraceptives. Since she is an informed,
rational, adult person who can give consent, should her request be granted on the
grounds of autonomous decision-making? Or should the doctor act paternalistically
and refuse on the basis that her wish is not in her best interest. The sterilization will
render her permanently infertile and if she should ever change her mind on the
matter, she probably will not be able to reverse the effects of the tubal ligation.
According to Draper (1991:83), doctors often feel these decisions should only be
made after the age of 35 since they assume that every woman naturally desires
children.
Various guidelines were subsequently developed in order to deal proactively with
scenarios like these. In the USA the so-called 120 Rule was used as a criterion for
sterilizing women. Unless a woman's age, multiplied by the number of her children
equaled at least 120, she would generally not be granted a request for sterilization
unless it could be justified on medical grounds (Callahan, 1998:348).
Some countries make use of a waiting period between giving consent and performing
the procedure. The actual time periods vary and may reach from three days to 30
days. In Denmark a maximum waiting period of six months is stipulated so that if
more than six months has lapsed, informed consent has to be obtained anew
(Friedman, 1978:1617).
Some guidelines also take the number of children the woman already has, into
account before the sterilization can be performed. Depending on the country the
minimum number of children can vary from one to five. For women who have never
given birth, a longer waiting period is often suggested (Friedman, 1978:1617). Age is
another guideline often used, suggesting that minors should never be sterilized and
requests for sterilization should only be considered once a woman has reached the
age of 30-35 (Draper, 1991:98; Friedman, 1978:1616).
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Other conditions such as proof of economic or social hardship, spousal consent, and
government supervision of the procedure has also been taken into consideration.
Written consent should always be obtained, preferably by both partners - which in
itself becomes problematic if one of the partners should refuse (Friedman,
1978:1617). Some suggest that only people who are sexually active and whose best
interests will be served must be allowed to undergo a sterilization. The implication of
this is that men should never be sterilized since they are not exposed to the dangers
and risks associated with pregnancy and giving birth (Draper, 1991 :87).
Draper (1991 :84-86) argues that someone who wants a sterilization and who can
give valid consent, should not be refused a sterilization since: (a) the refusal is based
on a third party's consideration that their perception of what is in the person's best
interest, is actually better than the person's own; (b) if a sterilization is refused,
people are actually being coerced into accepting other forms of contraception or into
becoming parents; and (c) the argument that the childfree, by the lack of knowledge
about what it is like to have children, are incompetent to make this particular decision
themselves, is invalid.
The strict measures to discourage certain groups of women to undergo sterilizations
and the strong encouragement of other groups of women to undergo the procedure,
hint at the impact that gender, class, racial and also population concerns have on law
and public policy governing birth control. Some governments adopt "pronatalist"
policies such as disallowing contraception (including contraceptive sterilization), as
well as elective abortions and precluding women from working outside the family.
These may be motivated by concerns of national survival and national superiority as
well as fears that birth control is harmful to the general good. Other governments
adopt antinatalist policies, where families are forbidden to have more than a certain
number of children. This often results in women being pressured into abortions and
sterilizations accompanied by a sharp increase in the occurrence of infanticide and
child abandonment (Callahan, 1998:337-338). Some governments adopt a
comomanon of pronatalist and antinatalist policies in order to maintain the dominance
of a certain group whilst eliminating the "unfit". These types of policy were especially
pronounced during the eugenics movement described in 2.3.1.
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Although sterilization abuse still occurs (especially in the developing countries), it is
the sterilization of people with intellectual disabilities which remains a much debated
and controversial topic. Some are strongly opposed to the sterilization of people with
intellectual disabilities, since these individuals cannot consent to the procedure.
Others feel that these individuals shouldn't be denied the opportunity to be sterilized
only because they are disabled - they are entitled to the same choices of
contraception available to the rest of the population. Countries such as the UK have
no formal policies or legislation that allow for the sterilization of the intellectually
disabled. If sterilization for someone who cannot consent to it, is sought, a formal
application has to be made to the court. In countries such as Germany and South
Africa legislation in this regard does exist (Strauss, 1995: 11).
2.4 South African policy
2.4.1 TheAbortion and Sterilization Act of 1975
The Abortion and Sterilization Act of 1975 regulated the sterilization of people who
are incompetent to give permission, until it was replaced by the Sterilization Act of
1998. According to the act of 1975 the sterilization of someone who couldn't give
consent was only allowed if the following criteria were met:
• Two medical doctors, of whom one must be a psychiatrist, had to certify in
writing that the person involved was fertile and
(a) had a heritable disease which, if a child were to be born, the child
would have a physical or mental disability of such a severe nature that the
child would be regarded as seriously disabled or
(b) the person involved is not able to comprehend the implications of
coitus or not able to take responsibility for the "fruit of coitus" because of
the permanent mental disability slhe suffers from
• the person who can give proxy consent, has to do so in writing, and if this
person is not available or cannot be found, a magistrate can do so on
their behalf
• the Minister of National Health (or a medical officer appointed by the
Minister) had to give written consent before the operation could be
performed
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According to Strauss (1995: 11) an average of 140-150 sterilizations of people with
mental handicap, were performed annually under this law, amounting to
approximately 1817 people by the year 1989 (Nash & Navias, 1992:438). According
to data from Groote Schuur Hospital for the period 1975-1989, 291 people were
referred for evaluations for sterilizations. The majority of people referred, were
coloured (80%), followed by 13% white and 7% black patients. Seventy-nine percent
of the applications were approved. Most of the applications came from family
members of whom one third were already caring for illegitimate offspring born to the
intellectually disabled women (Nash & Navias,1992:437).
Decisions about whether or not to approve the applications were often problematized
by the difficulties of accurately assessing the degree of intellectual disability. These
decisions often relied heavily on formal individual IQ testing with psychological tests
that only had valid and reliable norms for white Afrikaans and/or English speaking
people. Furthermore the Act of 1975 did not specify the age at which sterilizations
were permitted. This resulted in many adolescent girls being sterilized by means of
hysterectomies at the onset of puberty. By the year 1998, approximately 200
sterilizations were performed annually in the Western Cape under the 1975
legislation3.
2.4.2 The Sterilization Act of 1998
The Sterilization Act No.44 of 1998 replaced the previous legislation. The new act
makes provision for sterilizations to be performed on anyone who can give consent
and who is above the age of 18. It also explicitly states that no person who is
capable of consenting, may be involuntarily sterilized.
The Sterilization Act of 1998 also prohibits the sterilization of people under the age of
18 unless failing to do so will seriously impair their physical health.
For people who are intellectually disabled or incapable of giving consent, the
following criteria have been stipulated:
3l am indebted to Marie Adamo, Department of Health for this information.
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• The parent, spouse, guardian or curator has to apply for sterilization and has to
give consent for the procedure to be performed once the application has been
approved.
• A panel consisting of a psychiatrist (or Medical Officer if a psychiatrist is not
available), a psychologist (or social worker) and a nurse must conclude that:
• the person for whom the application is made, is at least 18 years old;
• that apart from sterilization, there are no other safe and effective forms of
contraception available;
• the person is mentally disabled to the extent that
• s/he cannot make their own decisions about contraception or sterilization
• s/he is incapable of developing mentally to a sufficient degree to make an
informed decision about contraception and/or sterilization
• s/he is unable to fulfill the parental responsibility associated with giving
birth;
• the degree of mental disability is severe; therefore, people with mild to
moderate degrees of intellectual disabilities are excluded from panel
approvements;
• the person performing the operation must ensure that the method of
sterilization holds the least health risk to the person.
Although this legislation has only been implemented recently, some ethical questions
have already been raised, such as, which form of birth control is regarded as the one
with the least health risk: long-term use of Depo-Provera or tubal ligation? Since the
Sterilization Act of 1998 came into effect, only 20 applications for the sterilization of
people with intellectual disabilities have been received in the Western Cape during
the first year. The reason for the relatively low rate is unclear, although it could be
that people are not familiar with the new legislation or that the criteria are so stringent
that very few people qualify. It is also possible that the majority of people for whom
sterilization is normally requested, fall within the mild to moderate range of
intellectual disability and according to this legislation can give informed consent
through the normal routes. As will be discussed in chapter three, it is often these
individuals who are interested in sexual relationships and who often struggle with the
demands of parenthood if only limited support is available. The issues of informed
consent, competence and the exercise of autonomous decision-making becomes
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interesting challenges when they are applied to people with intellectual disabilities
who have the desire to become parents. These issues will be dealt with in the rest of
the assignment.
2.5 Conclusion
Professionals and the public, for various reasons, welcomed the development at-
techniques to sterilize men and women. Not only did it provide a safe and relatively
effective form of contraception. Its effectiveness is also not hampered by human
error, such as forgetfulness. It quickJy became the "ideal" contraceptive for people
regarded as unsuitable for parenthood. Although eugenic policies and population
control programmes led to the sterilization of hundreds of thousands of individuals
(mostly people with mental disorders and intellectual disabilities), it is also often
criticized, especially for the authoritarian, coercive and careless ways in which the
procedure was implemented.
Currently the South African Jaw does make provision for the involuntary sterilization
of people with moderate to severe intellectual disabilities, but this practice raises
many ethical questions related to the principle of autonomy, informed consent and
autonomous decision-making. The individual's right to make autonomous decisions
about procreation and contraception (without state interference) is generally and
widely accepted. However, when it comes to people with intellectual disabilities,
there often exists a conflict between the interests of the individual and the interest of
society at large (Duncan et al, 1977:312).
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CHAPTER 3
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES
3.1 Introduction
The question, "who are the intellectually disabled?" can be approached from a
philosophical and/or a psychologicaVmedical perspective. According to Boddington
and Podpadec (1991:177), the psychological approach is often very clear on
definitions of intellectual disability but not so much concerned about "value
questions". In contrast, the philosophical approach tends to focus on issues of
personhood and is not so clear on definitions of intellectual disability. In this chapter
both approaches will receive some attention. First, the historical trends, definitions
and diagnosis of intellectual disabilities and related matters such as sexuality will be
addressed after which the notions of personhood, moral rights and moral status will
be briefly discussed.
3.2 A brief historic overview
The earliest written reference to intellectual disabilities can be traced to the
Therapeutic Papyrus of Thebes dated 1552BC. Yet there is widespread
anthropological evidence that the occurrence of intellectual disabilities predated this
time. Throughout the ages, political and socioeconomic factors largely determined
the understanding and treatment of the intellectually disabled. For instance in
nomadic tribes where the tribe couldn't afford to be burdened by nonproductive
members who used the limited resources without contributing meaningfully to the
tribes' survival, nonproductive members were regarded as expendable. In a similar
fashion, political authorities in the western world created either favorable
circumstances for handicapped people, or encouraged discriminatory and repressive
practices (Drew, Logan & Hardman, 1990:56).
Before the 18th century, intellectual disabilities were generally not regarded as a
major social problem and therefore didn't receive much attention. According to Drew
et al (1986:54) this could be explained by the fact that the "severely retarded" tended
to die of natural causes at a young age, whilst the mildly retarded were able to
contribute meaningfully to an agrarian society. Persons who were unable to cope
with life because of mental defects, were mostly dealt with by the polteeforce - ending
up in jailor cage-like facilities (Allen & Allen 1979:25).
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Until the 18th century no distinctions were made between mental illness and
intellectual disability. It was only thereafter that a distinction between the "lunatics"
(mentally ill person) and the "idiots" (person with intellectual disability) was gradually
being made. In recent years intellectual disabilities were once again closely
associated with mental illness, largely as the result of the wide acceptance of the
medical model (Molteno, 1997:115).
During the 19th century a "strong awakening of interest in the humane treatment of
the mentally retarded and insane" took place (Anastasi, 1982:5). A prerequisite for
appropriate treatment, however, was an accurate method to distinguish between the
two. One of the first attempts was made by a French physician, Esquirol, who
devised a system to distinguish between various types of "mental deviates" (Lea &
Foster, 1990:4). Eventually this led to the development of intelligence tests by
people such as Binet, Simon and Cattell, which in tum stimulated the development of
an (unrealistic) optimism at the turn of the 19th century that mental defectives could
be "cured" through intensive education. One of the first schools for children with
intellectual disabilities was established by the French physician, Seguin, who rejected
the belief that intellectual disabilities were incurable. However, the initial enthusiasm
was soon to be followed by a sense of disillusionment. Consequently the educational
programmes were replaced by custodial care initiatives (Allen & Allen 1979:25; Lea &
Foster, 1990:5). The movement towards custodial care followed from a set of beliefs
that the intellectually disabled are sick or diseased, in need of treatment and
hospitalization where the emphasis is on safety, cleanliness, comfort and medical
services. Although this was motivated by humanitarian concems, it inevitably lead to
the view that these people needed indefinite custodial care (Allen & Allen 1979:16).
The abovementioned historical trends illustrate the changes that took place in the
conceptualization of intellectual disabilities. Initially (mid 1800's), people were
concerned with the provision of adequate care and education for a group of people
who have been neglected and abused, but later on (early 1900's), people with
intellectual disabilities were generally viewed as morally defective and a danger to
society. Cohen, quoted in Foster (1990:23), describes four significant changes in the
way care was provided during the 18th and 19th centuries, namely:
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• increasing involvement by the state and a bureaucratic apparatus in the business
of deviancy control;
• increasing differentiation and classification of deviant groups into separate
categories, each with its own body of specialized scientific knowledge and
professional concern;
• increasing segregation of deviants into asylums, or "total institutions" (prisons,
reformatories, homes for wayward girls, mental hospitals, special schools), that
is, relatively closed and purpose-built institutions;
• decline of treatment or punishment in purely physical terms, with the mind
replacing the body as the object of repression.
In the words of Lea and Foster (1990:8), "to be mentally handicapped has come to
mean that the person is seen as a devalued member of society, one who is less than
fully human, one who is incapable of producing, one who is dependent and
incompetent, one who needs to be controlled and one whose civil rights are
curtailed". These changing conceptions also had major implications for the care the
intellectually disabled received.
Since the 1960's Western societies have seen what Cohen refers to as
"destructuring", a new pattern regarding the control of "deviancy". This is
characterized by shifts away from:
• the state, by means of deregulation and decentralisation;
• the expert, by means of deprofessionalisation, anti-psychiatry;
• the institution, by means of normalization, decarceration and community care;
• the individual, by means of a movement back to justice, human rights and a
community focus.
This pattern is also apparent in the current South African situation, where people with
intellectual disabilities are being deinstitutionalized and taken care of in the
community according to the principles of normalization. The term "normalization"
was coined by B. Nirje in 1968 and can be defined as:
.....making available to all mentally retarded people patterns of life and
conditions of everyday living which are as close as possible to the regular
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circumstances and ways of life of their society. Second, normalization means
giving society a chance to know and respect mentally retarded persons in
everyday life and to diminish the fears and myths that once caused society to
segregate them (Allen & Allen, 1979:67).
Normalization is therefore concemed with normalizing the environment of people with
intellectual disabilities and not necessarily with normalizing the person with an
intellectual disability (Allen & Allen, 1979:67; Drew et ai, 1990:324). The principles of
normalization and deinstitutionalization would be expensive if consistently translated
into policy and also creates numerous ethical problems and dilemmas, many of
which are discussed by Rose-Ackerman (1982). The normalization principle may
encourage policies that place people with intellectual disabilities in life situations that
are close to those chosen by normal people, with emphasis on aspects such as
housing, schooling, work, friendship and family life. Yet these people are often not
awarded the right to autonomous choice and self-respect. Rose-Ackerman (1982:90)
cites the example of an adult with an intellectual disability who may feel oppressed
when forced to normalize by settling down in a middle-class neighbourhood, doing a
regular job. According to her, this kind of normalization is not consistent with the
principle of autonomy. A similar argument may ensue for reproductive rights and the
intellectually disabled. Whilst the principle of normalization may lead to life situations
in which people with intellectual disabilities may become involved in sexual
relationships and may consider having a family of their own, they are often not
awarded autonomous decision-making powers in matters of reproduction.
3.3 Intellectual disabilities: the medicaUpsychological perspectives
The medical/psychological approach to intellectual disabilities concerns itself with
issues of terminology, classification and diagnoses. These aspects as well as
sexuality-related matters will be discussed in the next section.
3.3.1 Terminology
The use of terminology and labels to distinguish between categories or groups of
people can become very problematic. On the one hand, the label can lead to
stigmatization, devaluation and discrimination of certain groups of people: for
instance, it can lead to so-called "self-fulfilling prophecies where someone is labeled
as "ineducable", denied educational opportunities, and therefore the person becomes
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less competent, justifying the original label. On the other hand, the label can also be
beneficial in that the person's behaviour is better understood or that the person
becomes eligible for certain grants, exemptions or services (Molteno, 1997:114).
Through the ages various terms and labels have been used to refer to people with
intellectual disabilities. These terms include words such as "holy innocents", "special
children of God" (Allen & Allen, 1979: 25), "idiot", "imbecile", "moron" and ''feeble-
minded". Binet and Simon preferred the term "de bile" to "moron" while others used
the term "mentally deficient" and later terms such as "backward" and "mentally
defective" (Lea & Foster 1990:10). Some of these terms, such as "idiot" and
"imbecile" are currently viewed as archaic and have disappeared in most countries,
although in South Africa they are occasionally used in legal contexts. The label
"mental deficiency" has been replaced by the term "mental subnormality" and later
"mental handicap" in the UK and by the term "mental retardation" in the USA. The
World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended the term "mental subnormality"
which include two separate and distinct categories, namely, mental retardation and
mental deficiency. According to the WHO, mental retardation is used for subnormal
functioning secondary to identifiable underlying pathological causes, whereas mental
deficiency is mostly used as a legal term, applied to persons with an I.O. of less than
70 (Kaplan & Sadock, 1988:685). The term "feeble-minded ness" was often used in
American literature and is still used in Great Britain to refer to the mild forms of
mental retardation. "Oligophrenia" was commonly used in the Soviet Union,
Scandinavia and other Westem European countries (Kaplan, Sadock & Grebb,
1994:1025). In general, it is regarded as unacceptable to refer to anyone as
"mentally handicapped". The preferred description is "a person with an intellectual
disability". Currently the term used by the Western Cape Forum for the Intellectually
Disabled, is "intellectual disability". This is also the term which is currently preferred
in the Department of Health and Social Services and therefore also the term used in
the current assignment.
3.3.2 Diagnosis
Intellectual disability is not a unitary disorder and the intellectually disabled not a
homogenous group. The causes of intellectual disabilities are manifold and are to a
large extend still unknown, whilst the experiences, personalities and histories of the
intellectually disabled vary greatly (Kaplan & Sadock, 1988:685; Molteno, 1997:113).
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In general there are two major conceptual approaches to defining intellectual
disabilities, namely the biomedical and the sociocultural adaptational models. The
biomedical model emphasizes the presence of basic changes in the brain as
essential to the diagnosis of intellectual disability whereas the sociocultural
adaptational model places emphasis on the social functioning and general ability of a
person to adapt to accepted norms in society (Kaplan, Sadock & Grebb, 1994:1025).
The most commonly used definition of mental retardation/handicap/intellectual
disability was developed by the American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD)
in co-operation with scientists, practitioners, consumers and family organisations and
read as follows:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in the present functioning.
It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing
concurrently with limitations in two or more of the fol/owing applicable skil/
areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use,
self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and work.
Mental retardation manifests before age 18.
This definition illustrates the movement towards the sociocultural adaptational model
away from the pure biomedical model.
According to the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM IV), mental retardation can be diagnosed if the following criteria is
met:
A Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning: an IQ of 70
or below on an individually administered IQ test (for infants, a clinicat
judgment of significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, since
available intelligence tests do not yield numerical values).
B Concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning (i.e., the
person's effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or
her age by his or her cultural group in areas such as social skills and
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responsibility, communication, daily living skills, personal
independence and self-sufficiency).
C Onset before the age of 18.
The DSM IV criteria for mental retardation is similar to the definitions provided by the
AAMD. The DSM IV also describes the following four types of mental retardation
(reflecting the degree of retardation): mild, moderate, severe and profound. For a
more detailed description of the developmental characteristics and IQ range
associated with each of these categories of mental retardation, the reader is referred
to table one.
The diagnostic criteria of the DSM IV is viewed as problematic because of its heavy
reliance on formally administered intelligence tests and intelligence scores. Untit
recently the norms for the tests used in South Africa were developed on white
subjects only. No norms were available for the non white sector of society, yet they
were diagnosed as intellectually disabled on the basis of their achievement in these
tests. These intelligence tests are also strongly culturally biased and often assume a
formal educational background. Psychosocial deprivation such as deprivation in
social, linguistic and intellectual stimulation can contribute to scoring low on IQ tests.
Some of the problems associated with formal assessments of intelligence in South
Africa include: the use of English tests for populations that have not been exposed to
English as it is used in the tests; the use of culture-bound concepts which are difficult
to translate appropriately into other languages; the ecological invalidity of tests which
doesn't assess the functional skills required in a particular socio-cultural, economic,
linguistic and geographic environment; and the use of inappropriate norms to
determine level of intellectual functioning (Venter, 1993:35-36).
IQ tests are constructed with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. This
means that if you score an average of 70, your "real" IQ can range anything from 55
to 85. The implication being that your score of 70 can be indicative of either a
moderate intellectual disability or a "below average" level of intelligence. Needless to
say, this can have serious implications - also in terms of sterilization policies - if not
interpreted with caution. With an IQ of 85 a person can most probably take
reasonably good care of their own children. With an IQ of 55 the person will probably
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Degree of mental IQRange Mentally handicapped Age 0-5:maturation Age 6-20:training and Aduit 21 and over:
handicap population (%) and development education social and vocational
adequacy
Profound Below 20 or 25 1-2 Gross retardation; Some motor development Some motor and speech
minimal capacity for present; may respond to development; may achieve
functioning in minimal or limited very limited self-care;
sensorimotor areas; needs training in self-help. needs nursing care
nursing care; constant aid
and supervision required.
Severe 20-25 to 35-40 3-4 Poor motor development; Can talk or learn to May contribute partially
speech minimal; generally commtiEUcate; can be to self-maintenance under
unable to profit from trained in elemental health complete supervision; can
training in self-help; little habits; profits from develop self-protection
or no communication systematic habit training skills to a minimal useful
skills unable to profit from level in controlled
vocational training. environment.
Moderate 35-40 to 35-40 10 Can talk or learn to Can profit from training in May achieve self-
communicate; poor social social and occupational maintenance in unskilled
awareness; fair motor skills; unlikely to progress or semiskilled work under
development; profits from beyond second-grade level sheltered conditions;
training in self-help; can in academic subjects; may needs supervision and
be managed with learn to travel alone in guidance when under mild
moderate supervision familiar places. social or economic stress.
Mild 50-55 to approx. 70 85 Can develop social and Can learn academic skills Can usually achieve social
communication skills; up to approximately sixth- and vocational skills
minimal retardation in grade level by late teens; adequate to minimum
sensory-motor areas; often can be guided toward self-support but may need
not distinguished from social conformity guidance and assistance
normal until later age when under unusual social
or economic stress
--
Table 1. IQ range and developmental characteristics of the intellectually disabled according to the DSM IV (Kaplan & Sadock, 1988, p.l 026)
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experience it as more challenging and will have high support needs. This illustrates
that reliance on IQ testing alone is problematic and that an assessment of the
person's level of adaptive functioning is imperative.
In the South African context further distinctions used to be made according to a
child's level of intellectual functioning. According to Wigton, Adnams and King
(1997:45) children with an IQ between 50-80 used to be classified as in need of
special education (i.e. educable), with an IQ between 30-50 as trainable and with an
IQ of less than 30 as being untrainable. The Department of Education was a key
role-player in the lives of children with mild to moderate intellectual disabilities
whereas those with severe disabilities were the responsibility of the Departments of
Health and Welfare. Currently calls are being made for a more integrated approach
through which the rights of the intellectually disabled are protected and a supportive
atmosphere of individual considerations is created.
3.3.3 Sexuality, pregnancy and matters of reproduction
If one accepts the different categories of intellectual disabilities described in the DSM
IV, it is clear from table one that the largest group (85%) falls within the mild range.
This group often develops an interest in relationships, including sexual relationships
and the wish to have their own children. According to Drew, Logan and Hardman
(1990:335) as a group, 50% of people with intellectual disabilities remain unmarried,
although marriage is highly valued. Sexual intimacy is both valued and feared.
These writers also found that although success have been achieved in teaching the
intellectually disabled some sociaVsexual skills, staff working at institutions generally
believe that the intellectually disabled should not be allowed to express their sexuality
freely. Despite the fact that the intellectually disabled are increasingly encouraged
and educated to become involved in relationships and to express their sexuality
appropriately, they may still experience pregnancy, childbirth and child-rearing as
very stressful and may need intensive assistance and guidance during these periods.
According to Molteno (1997: 117) the question of sexuality for people with intellectual
disabilities underwent various changes. For a long time it was felt that sex should be
eliminated or forbidden among people with intellectual disabilities. Molteno
(1997:117) ascribed this to the public's opinion that these people were oversexed
and degenerate and therefore should be punished. On the other hand, people with
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intellectual disabilities are often viewed as perpetual children in whom the
preservation of innocence is desired. Gradually more tolerance has been expressed,
but it is still often seen as desirable that sexual relations be controlled and that sexual
boundaries between the general public and people with intellectual disabilities be
strictly enforced. This was relatively easy whilst people with intellectual disabilities
were institutionalized, but with an increase in deinstitutionalization, and the
implementation of normalization principles, the expression of sexuality and the
management thereof became more challenging. With these developments, sex and
relationship education for people with intellectual disabilities became paramount.
However, in South Africa the attitude regarding sexuality and the intellectually
disabled has not changed much, and it is still viewed as something that should be
eliminated or at the very least, be tolerated.
A further confounding factor is the conflict between the law and the free expression of
sexuality by the intellectually disabled person. For example, the Mental Health Act of
1973 states that any person who has carnal intercourse with a female who is
detained in an institution shall be guilty of an offence. Similarly, the Sexual Offences
Act of 1957, section 15, states that a person who has, or attempts to have, sexual
intercourse with a male or female "idiot" or "imbecile", which is not rape, shall be
guilty of an offence. According to Davis and Foster (1990:239) the mentally
handicapped person cannot enter a valid marriage contract. "A person who is
incapable of understanding the nature of the marriage contract or the duties or
responsibilities which it creates due to his or her mental disease or defect, cannot
contract a valid marriage nor can such a person's legal capacity be agreed by a
curator" (Hahlo, cited in Davis & Foster, 1990:239). Although these acts are
intended to protect people who are vulnerable for sexual abuse or exploitation, it
doesn't make provision for those individuals with intellectual disabilities who wish to
express their sexuality in meaningful ways within the confines of for example a
marriage. These discrepancies between the law and departmental policies illustrate
the need to investigate questions of autonomous decision-making and informed
consent for sexual intercourse as well as a need to initiate a process of education
regarding sexuality and socially acceptable practices (Molteno 1997:118). Roelofse
and Kleintjes (1996) conducted a small study on informed consent and the
intellectually disabled and some of their results are summarized in tables two and
three.
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Aspects of informed consent Profound Severe Severe upper Moderate lower Moderate upper to
lower Mild
Sexual knowledge No No Poor Poor Poor-fair
(knows important facts)
Consequences No No No Poor Poor-fair
(Know risks and benefits)
Expressive comprehension No No Very limited Very limited to Limited-fair
(of knowledge and consequences) limited
Ability to follow through on No No Very limited Limited Limited-fair
knowledge/value systems
Choice: ability to say yes/no to No No Limited Limited No-Fair
non-coercive sexual opportunities
Coercion: ability to withstand No No No No Extremely limited
force (physical, emotional, power and inconsistent
in sexual advances)
Table 2. Ability to give informed consent in persons with profound to mild mental retardation (Roelofse & Kleintjes, 1995).
w~
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Level of IQ Developmental Sexuality
functioning range age
Profound-Severe Under Under 4 years 1. Enjoys physical stimulation including stimulation of sexual organs.
lower 27 2. Cannot contextualise sexual contact or activity within social norms.
3. Cannot discriminate between "acceptable" and "unacceptable".
4. Cannot recognize potential or actual abuse (sexual) or danger.
5. Cannot grasp the implications of AIDS/HIV and STD's.
I6. May occupy self with self-stimulation (including sexual) in situations where
alternative constructive stimulation is not provided/available.
7. Most probably will not become sexually active with a person, unless exposed to
and/or encouraged to become sexually active by another person.
8. Cannot say no.
9. Cannot give informed consent.
Sever upper- 28-42 4-6 years 1. Severely limited ability to place sexual activity into context of social norms and
Moderate lower taboos.
2. Will become involved in "imitative relationships" but do not understand full meaning
of scope/limits of intimate association i.e. limited grasp hence of terms such as
"girlfriend" and "boyfriend".
3. Open to abuse by family members as not capable of fully understanding these
relationships and sexual limits within family setting.
4. Also may be sexually active for reward.
5. Multiple partners if opportunity, despite professing knowledge of single partner
policy.
6. Explore definition of sex as tends to label all intimate touching as sex, eg. Hand
holding, kissing, genital touching. Unlikely to become orogenitally active unless
introduced to it by someone else.
7. Informed consent: severely limited ability in all individuals
8. No understanding of AIDS/STD's, contraceptives
9. Can be taught concept of privacy, safe/hygieneic sexual techniques, cannot follow
through consistently. Reminder need to be builtintQ daily programme. \jJ
VI
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Level of IQ Developmental Sexuality
functioning range a_ge
Moderate Upper- 43-70 6-10~ years 1. Most able to understand basic relationships
Mild 2. In terms of expectations of different relationships but still have difficulty defining
terms I
3. Can be taught to recognize danger and abuse, but under pressure still not able to
follow through safely.
4. May engage in full range of sexual activity but some remains sexually inactive or
only involved in self-stimulation.
5. Can understand concept of privacy and practice this but remains open to abuse
under pressure.
6. Small percentage may engage in multi-partner relationships, but many will follow
through on consistently taught one partner policy.
7. Responds to educational input in small groups on couple or individual basis-
environmental structuring and reminders needed.
--
8. May not always follow through consistently.
Table 3. Expectancies for sexual knowledge and practice in persons with severe to mild mental handicap (Roelofse and Kleintjes, 1995).
w
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From these results it is clear that informed consent with reference to sexual
relationships and the intellectually disabled remain difficult to implement on a
practical level. These individuals often constitute borderline cases in terms of
decision-making abilities. The tension between respecting the person's autonomous
decision-making in matters of sexuality and procreation and acting patemalistically to
protect the person from exploitation and suffering, remains a dilemma that will be
further investigated in the remainder of this assignment.
Another related matter that is often a concem for parents of intellectually disabled
daughters, is the management of menstruation. Parents and care-givers of these
women often hold views and attitudes that menstruation is inconvenient,
embarrassing and that many would avoid it as far as possible - very similar to the
societal taboos on menstruation. This resulted in many intellectually disabled women
not being adequately prepared for menarche and not being seen as capable of
learning menstrual management. In general the suppression or elimination of
menstruation among these women is widely accepted by the people who assist and
care for them (Griffin, Carlson, Taylor & Wilson 1994: 106, 112). Until the recent past,
these attitudes have often led to routine administration of hysterectomies at the onset
of puberty.
fn a study conducted by Taylor and Carlson (1993) it was found that requests for
hysterectomies were mostly motivated in terms of menstruation management. It was
argued for instance, that for women with inteJlectuaJ disabiJities, menstruation is:
• unnecessary and unhealthy;
• the removal of the uterus have no long-term health effects on the woman;
• menstruation is inevitably painful;
• the inteJlectuaJly disabled woman wiJl react negatively to menstruation and
• teaching menstrual skills is stressful and impractical.
Taylor and Carlson (1993:142) found no evidence in the research literature that
support these views and also note that very few alternatives to hysterectomies were
investigated in these cases. Their suggestion is that na proactive, supportive
approach to assisting young women and their families prior to menarche would be
preferable to a reactive and potentially confrontational approach when decisions to
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seek menstrual and fertility elimination have been made on the basis of possible
limited information" (p.151).4
To conclude, parents, caregivers and members of society often feel that people with
intellectual disabilities should not be encouraged to become involved in relationships,
including sexual relationships and should not be considered to have children of their
own (Edgerton, 1999:1). Although many express concerns for the well-being of
children born to the intellectually disabled, many are also concerned for the disabled
person's own physical and emotional well-being, should they be sexually active or
become parents. Many of these opinions stem from beliefs that the intellectually
disabled should not be awarded the same rights and moral status as other members
of society because the intellectually disabled do not have the mental faculties to
make decisions on these matters - they should rather be cared for and protected by
others. Underlying many of these beliefs is the notion that the intellectually disabled
do not have personhood (or at best, only marginal personhood), are of lesser value
and therefore normal human and moral rights (and the right to procreate) are not
applicable to them. In contrast to this view the Symposium on Normalization and
Integration of 1977 states: "there is a need for age-appropriate sex education,
including birth control techniques and parenthood information. With regard to
voluntary sterilization and abortion, the same rights apply to a mentally retarded
person as to any other citizen" (Allen & Allen, 1979:83). There seems to be two
opposinq points of view: on the one hand people with intellectual disabilities are seen
as persons entitled to the same treatment in matters of procreation as all other
members of society. On the other hand people with intellectual disabilities are
regarded as subhuman or less than human and consequently not entitled to equal
moral status than other human beings.
4 Currently it is relatively common practice to prescribe contraceptives, such as Depo
Provera, to these women since it has the cessation of menstruation as an additional
effect. Although relatively effective, it also leads to weight gains and there is still
uncertainty as to the long-term effects it might have on the woman's health. The
receiving of three-monthly injections is often also reported as a source of stress for
many intellectually disabled persons.
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3.4 Intellectual disabilities: the philosophical perspectives
The philosophical perspectives on intellectual disabilities often focus on value
questions, such as the moral status of the intellectually disabled person, issues of
personhood and the ascription of rights (including reproductive rights) to them. In the
final section of this chapter these aspects will be briefly discussed.
3.4.1 Moral status and personhood
'When does a human life start to matter morally?" is the question mostly posed in the
abortion debates. With regard to debates about intellectual disabilities, the question
can be rephrased to, "what gives a human life moral status or significance?" The
answer to this question led theorists to search for universal criteria of moral status.
The following have been most commonly proposed in the abortion debates: life,
sentience, genetic humanity and personhood (Warren, 1993:307).
In terms of the "ethic of reverence of life", echoing Albert Schweizer's sentiments, all
organisms have a will to live and generally will strive for survival of itself and often
also the species. Implicit to this argument, is the notion that all living organisms
warrant respect and have some sort of moral value or moral status. Based on these
assumptions, all things being equal, the killing of any form of life without good reason
is wrong (Warren, 1993:309). People with intellectual disabilities, normal persons,
animals and other organisms all should be respected because any form of life has
intrinsic value and therefore warrants respect. Yet, people do not generally regard
the moral status of simple organisms and animals as being equal to that of human
beings. Humans kill animals and other life forms for their own survival, therefore
from necessity. An adult human being and a fetus are not usually treated as if they
have equal moral status. For instance, in emergency situations where a pregnant
woman's life is in danger, the focus of intervention will normally be to save the
woman's life, even if it will lead to the loss of the fetus. Thus, although it is generally
agreed that all life has worth and is intrinsically valuable, this criterion is not helpful in
determining sufficiently the moral status of various life forms. It is not helpful in
determining whether people with intellectual disabilities have equal moral standing to
other human beings or not, even though people may agree that they deserve some
form of respect since they do constitute a form of life.
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Common genetic humanity has also been suggested as a requirement for equal
moral status. According to this position, all life forms that are genetically related to
human beings, have equal moral status tyVarren1993:308). These include fetuses,
infants, people with disabilities, comatose individuals, etc. People with intellectual
disabilities, according to this argument should be regarded as having equal moral
standing to all other human beings, because they are genetically related to the
human species. From this it follows that all humans deserve respect no matter what
their level of intelligence may be. Kopelman (1982:72) argues that there are four
types of respect, namely, esteem, regard for agency, regard for class membership
and attention to or acceptance of limitations. She argues that all people with
intellectual disabilities (even the profoundly disabled) are deserved of respect due to
their class membership and common genetic humanity.
As a third possible prerequisite for moral status, sentience has also been suggested.
The sentience criterion regards moral status as dependant on the capacity to have
experiences, especially those of pleasure and pain. In general it can be said that
sentient beings have a basic interest in the experience of pleasure and the avoidance
of pain and that sentience requires a functioning central nervous system rNarren,
1993:308). According to this criterion, all things being equal, if a person with an
intellectual disability is sentient and can experience pleasure and/or pain, they at
least have equal moral status to other sentient beings such as animals (Spieker,
1990:142).
Some theorists, such as Locke, have classified people with intellectual disabilities as
falling within a category somewhere between human and animal, such as
"subhuman". This view was also supported by Downie and Telfer who write: "On the
lowest level are the animals, who are regarded as having a presumptive right not to
suffer.....Next we have what we may call 'sub-normal' humans, who are not accorded
full respect but are not treated like animals either. ...Finally we have the normal
humans who are accorded full respect (quoted in Spieker, 1990:143). According to
these writers, sentience alone is not a sufficient criterion to distinguish between the
moral status of animals, normal human beings and the intellectually disabled.
Instead, they suggest that personhood (or lack thereof) be used in discussions about
the equal moral status of human beings. People with intellectual disabilities are thus
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
41
often considered as cases of marginal personhood, of less than fully human beings,
yet distinctively different from other sentient beings.
There seems to be no general agreement about the concept of a person, yet most
philosophers agree that personhood refers to an entity which has moral rights,
including the right to life, and therefore should be treated as a full member of the
moral community (Pryzyluska-Fiszer, 1997:168). In discussions of what constitutes
personhood the following criteria have been suggested:
• Any being capable of valuing its own existence. This becomes apparent in the
use of language and other indications of self-consciousness and self-awareness
(Harris, 1985:18).
• The ability to be conscious of oneself as existing over time - as having a past and
a future, as well as a present (Buchanan & Brock, 1989:160).
• The ability to appreciate reasons for or against acting; being (sometimes) able to
inhibit impulses or inclinations when one judges that it would be better not to act
on them (Buchanan & Brock, 1989:160).
• The ability to engage in purposive sequences of actions (Buchanan & Brock,
1989:160).
• Dennett (quoted in Boddington and Podpadec, 1991:185) identified the following
conditions for personhood: (1) A person is a rational being. (2) Persons are
beings to which states of consciousness are attributed or psychological or mental
or intentional predicates are ascribed. (3) Whether something counts as a
person depends in some way on an attitude towards it. (4) The object to which
this personal stance is taken must be capable of reciprocating in some way. (5)
Persons must be capable of verbal communication. (6) Persons are self-
conscious.
• Each individual is an original center of being and action, with distance between
what they are and what they do. Persons are knowing subjects with a certain
degree of freedom (Van Melsen, 1978:1207).
• Being a person is a dynamic process, meaning that a person has the possibility
of becoming more and more of a person and this is the result of a dynamic
process between the individual and sociocultural aspects (Van Melsen,
1978:1207).
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• A person is an individua substantia rationa/is naturae (an individual substance of
rational nature). There are therefore two necessary conditions, which are jointly
sufficient for personhood, namely individuality and rationality (Mori, 1996:158).
The abovementioned criteria or requirements for personhood are not very useful in
debates such as whether people with intellectual disabilities can claim equal moral
status or moral standing to other "normal" human beings. First of all, there is no
agreement as to which of these criteria should be used to determine personhood and
secondly it is unclear how one on an empirical level can determine whether someone
has for instance sufficient self-consciousness to award them personhood. The
intellectually disabled as a class cannot be classified as having personhood or not,
since the degree of disability within the group vary so much. This type of
classification will have to take place on an individual level.
Furthermore the concept of a person need not be restricted to human beings. As
suggested by Prsyluska-Fiszer (1997:168) it is quite possible to hold that some
persons, such as God, angels, devils, higher animals such as chimpanzees, are not
members of Homo Sapiens. Prsyluska-Fiszer (1997:168) also argues that the
concept of a person as with the term "human", is used both in a normative
(moral/legal) sense and a descriptive (commonsense) sense. The requirements for
personhood as listed above are used in a descriptive sense to make claims about a
human being in the moral or normative sense. Yet, it can be argued convincingly
that normative moral principles, rights and obligations cannot be derived from what is
essential to the concept of a person. To determine whether a person with intellectual
disabilities can be regarded as a person is a moral decision for which one require
moral reasons. Although people with intellectual disabilities may lack some faculty or
set of faculties that other persons possess, it doesn't necessarily follow that they do
not have personhood. Unless one can argue that there are some faculties that are
essential to being a person, this cannot be a sufficient basis on which to deny their
humanity.
From the arguments presented above, it seems that although personhood as an
inclusion criteria of moral equality, is important, it does not serve sufficiently as an
exclusion criterion. Equal moral status to all persons should be acknowledged, but
people cannot be excluded from moral equality because it is suggested that certain
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human beings such as the intellectually disabled and infants are lacking certain
faculties that are regarded essential to personhood.
Furthermore, history proves that it is all too easy for dominant groups to rationalize
oppression by claiming that oppressed persons are not really persons at all, because
of some alleged mental or moral deficiency. This has been especially true of the
intellectually disabled who are generally devalued in society and consequently often
denied moral rights and moral status and even treated inhumanely because they are
categorized as non persons or less than persons.
The proposed solution is to seek a middle path between the "ethics of reverence for
life" which is too inclusive as a criterion for moral equality, and personhood, which
seems to be too exclusive. A plausible middle path is to use a combination of the
criterion of common genetic humanity and sentience. Therefore, any being who are
genetically related to Homo Sapiens and who can be classified as sentient should be
awarded equal moral status and equal moral rights. Most, if not all, people with
intellectual disabilities do have sentience and share genetic material with other
human beings and thus warrants equal moral status.
3.4.2 Moral rights
Liberal individualism, especially in the form of rights theory, has emphasized the
importance of creating a space in democratic societies, within which the individual is
protected as well as allowed to follow and pursue personal projects and initiatives.
Rights can be defined as "a justified claim or entitlement, validated by moral
principles and rules". Rights are often classified in two ways, namely legal rights and
natural human rights (which are usually divided into life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness). Although classified in this way the two types do not exclude each other
and actually serve to reinforce each other (Ulrich, 1976:351). The first rights of a
citizen are his rights as a person, his human rights. Constitutions and legal rights
were developed to guarantee these fundamental human rights.
legal rights can be further divided into two kinds: (1) legal rights which protect one
from undue interference by the state and from harmful acts of others; and (2) legal
rights that permit persons to make choices which have significant long-term
consequences, choices that seem to require mature capacities {Hafen, quoted in
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Schoeman, 1980:7). When applied to the intellectually disabled, it could be argued
that the latter group of rights is not appropriately ascribed to some people with
intellectual disabilities and that the right to be protected from their own immaturity or
impairments should also be safeguarded.
In 1971 the United National General Assembly produced a Declaration of General
and Special Rights of 'the Mentally Handicapped' (see Appendix A) in which it was
clearly stated that people with intellectual disabilities should be awarded the same
human rights as all other citizens as far as it is feasible. The constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 does not explicitly mention rights of the intellectually
disabled, but acknowledges the following rights of relevance to people with
disabilities;
• the right to equality and freedom from discrimination;
• the right to dignity;
• the right to family care, parental care or alternative care, basic nutrition, shelter,
basic health care and social services;
• the right to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation;
• the right to a basic and further education (Wigton et aI, 1997:46).
Among theorists, the ascription of rights to the intellectually disabled by the United
Nations, is a contentious issue. Some feel that there are serious reasons why
handicapped people need to have rights: rights protect them from limitations and
abuses, and it offers them scope for further personal development. The intellectually
disabled need the right to have rights (Spicker, 1990:149).
Others claim that natural rights cannot be generalized to the intellectually disabled,
because in order to have a right, a being must be able to understand what it is like to
have a right and to have it respected or violated. For the intellectually disabled, to
possess human rights, some degree of competence is a prerequisite. A person can
only make claims about rights if that person has a right to choose, therefore the
person must have the capacity to choose. It is claimed that people with intellectual
disabilities do not have these abilities and therefore do not meet the requirements of
personhood and the claim to rights. This argument is refuted by the fact that many
incompetent people such as comatose individuals and infants, are still regarded as
having rights even though at that point in time, they cannot comprehend all the
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implications of having that right ~oozley, 1982:48). A rights-holder does not
necessarily have to assert those rights in order to have them. This has an important
implication for children, the comatose and the intellectually disabled, since it means
that they still have rights even though they may not be able to claim those rights.
Rights claims can be made on their behalf by authorized others (Beauchamp &
Childress, 1994:71-72).
Murphy (1984: 11) argues that the intellectually disabled will never be in a position
where it could be claimed that their destinies ought to be determined by their own
choices and decisions. Based on social contract grounds he argues that they do
have rights, but these will for the most part be rights to a certain kind of patemalistic
protection. Mechanisms are needed through which the interests of people with
intellectual disabilities are protected, but there is also the serious risk that the
ascription of "incompetence" to the intellectually disabled may ultimately diminish
rights rather than protect it (Spicker, 1990:147).
A mid-way between the two positions, is suggested by the declaration of the United
Nations of 1971 when it states, "some mentally retarded persons may be unable, due
to the severity of their handicap to exercise for themselves all of these rights in a
meaningful way". Thus, it may be necessary that the modification of some or all of
the rights is appropriate for some people with intellectual disabilities and/or that their
rights will have to be claimed on their behalf. Margolis (1982:22-23) suggests that
the procedure used for the modification must contain proper legal safeguards against
every form of abuse, must be based on an evaluation of the social capability of the
intellectually disabled person by qualified experts and must be subject to periodic
reviews and to the right of appeal to higher authorities. The intention behind this is to
allow a gradation regarding competence among the intellectually disabled to
determine which rights could justifiably be restricted to specific individuals.
Clearly there exist a tension between the individual with an intellectual disability and
the intellectually disabled as a class. Rights are usually ascribed to a person based
on class membership. In the same way as an animal has rights as a member of the
class of sentient beings, the intellectually disabled may be seen as in possession of
rights, some as a human being with certain capacities, others as human beings with
certain incapacities. As argued earlier, the intellectually disabled is regarded as on
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equal moral standing with other human beings and therefore they are also entitled to
the same rights. However, they may be limited in their abilities to exercise those
rights themselves, and some modifications to the content and process of rights
ascription may be needed. These modifications however, need to be made on an
individualized basis since people with intellectual disabilities vary so widely in terms
of the degree of disability. One of the areas, in which the modification of rights for
the intellectually disabled has been suggested, is the right to reproduce.
The right to conceive and bear offspring is seemingly implied in the right to life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness. It can be interpreted as a claim to natural human
rights, specified by Cartwright (1994:75) as a liberty right and not a claim right. The
right to reproduce can be regarded as a negative right that is a right to be free from
interference by others in choices regarding reproduction. This right is not regarded
as absolute, since for example marriages of close kinship is prohibited in most
countries and in some countries (i.e. China) couples are restricted to the number of
children they may have. Furthermore, reproduction does not only occur by means of
sexual intercourse, and the question can be asked whether reproduction by means of
in vitro fertilization is also included in reproductive rights' claims.
The right to reproduce, as a liberty right, implies that reproduction occurs with a
willing partner and that it is not restricted to the right to beget or bear children, but
also the right to rear children. Two possible constraints identified by Cartwright
(1994:75-76) in exercising these rights, are (1) an understanding of what one is doing
and (2) the person who is reproducing have certain obligations to fulfill to its
offspring. Thus, although people with intellectual disabilities may physically be able
to perform sexual intercourse and conceive offspring, they may lack an
understanding of what they are doing. Therefore they are not able to do so out of
choice and thus lacks the right to have children. According to this argument a certain
minimal level of conceptual competence is required before the right to have children
can be exercised. Exactly what this level of competence is, however, is not clear.
The second possible constraint, suggested by Cartwright (1994:80-81), is that those
who choose to reproduce have the obligation to do what is minimally required to
equip their children to lead independent adult lives. This obligation may be
interpreted as a constraint to the right to reproduce: those who are unable or
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unwilling to comply with this obligation will lack the right to reproduce. This, however,
is a problematic argument, since there is no consensus as to what constitutes
adequate care for children. Although children may have disadvantaged lives, it
doesn't mean that their lives are not worthwhile. However, rights and obligations
have a ''firm but untidy correlativity" (Beauchamp &Childress, 1994:74) and therefore
the right to reproduce obligates parents to care for their children. If they fail to
provide "minimal required care" the parents may forfeit the right to their children. The
right to have children, however should generally be safeguarded by society, although
the right to one's children is not regarded as absolute.
Writers such as Tannsjë (1999:238) argue that, based on the principle of autonomy,
society should never interfere with people's rights to conceive, bear and raise
children. This standpoint also includes the intellectually disabled person. If people
have demonstrated their inability to care adequately for their children, then and only
then, could society interfere with matters of procreation. According to writers such as
Tannsjë and Cartwright (1994), the practice according to which people have to
qualify in order to exercise their right to procreate, based on only one criterion such
as their perceived ability to care for children, is discriminatory. In general then, the
right to procreate is regarded as a universal and natural human right which can be
exercised freely, unless due to some unique and serious consideration (such as the
risk for genetic illnesses due to procreation by close family members), society deems
it necessary to interfere. These arguments, as it pertain to the intellectually disabled,
will be further discussed in chapter six.
3.5 Conclusion
The intellectually disabled do not constitute a homogenous group - their
personalities, experiences and levels of functioning may vary greatly (Boddington &
Podpadec, 1992:361). Consequently the way they experience and express their own
sexuality may also show a large variation. Some may show an interest in intimate,
sexual relationships while others may not. Some may express the wish to have
children of their own, whilst others do not. Yet, until relatively recently, society in
general has not been supportive of their free expression of sexuality - often out of
concern for the well-being of children born to them as well as concern for their own
physical and mental well-being. As discussed in the present chapter, these
sentiments follow from beliefs about the inferior moral status of the intellectually
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disabled. They are often seen as not morally equal to other human beings, and
therefore not entitled to the same moral and human rights as other citizens. In this
chapter it was argued that the intellectually disabled has equal moral standing to
other human beings because (1) they are sentient and (2) they share a common
genetic humanity. It was also argued that they are in principle entitled to the same
rights as other citizens, although the content and process through which these rights
are exercised may have to be revised to accommodate their limitations. In terms of
the right to procreate, some authors are of the opinion that, based on the principle of
autonomy, no one should be prohibited from conceiving children. Others feel that the
right to procreate cannot extend to people who do not possess a certain minimal
level of conceptual competence and who therefore cannot be granted autonomous
decision-making power. Autonomy, the principle of autonomy and how it can be
applied to the intellectually disabled will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER4
AUTONOMY: A THEORETICAL ACCOUNT
4.1 Introduction
The emphasis on autonomy and respect for autonomy as guiding ethical principles, is
often regarded as the distinguishing feature of zo" century Western medical ethics.
Some alleges that autonomy and the principle of respect for autonomy has largely
replaced the principles of benevolence and non-maleficence - principles that
dominatedWestern medicine since the adoption of the Hippocratic oath. Attempts at
definitions and conceptualizations of autonomy, respect for autonomy and the
application of this principle to medical ethics are manifold and haven't reached any
finality yet. Therefore, the present chapter will aim to provide a brief overview of the
historical as well as contemporary ideas concerning the concept of autonomy. More
specifically, the work of Kant and Mill will be discussed as well as the ideas of
contemporary writers, such as Feinberg and Dworkin. This chapter will conclude with
a discussion of feminist and communitarian critiques of autonomy.
4.2 Autonomy
The word autonomy is etymologically derived from the Greek words autos (self) and
nomos (rule or law) and therefore literally means self-determination or self-rule
(Holm, 1998:267). Although the concept autonomy can be traced back to the early
Greek political philosophy, it was almost always used to refer to city-states and not to
individual persons. It is only since the Enlightenment that the concept autonomy has
been associated with the individual - both in philosophy and society at large (Holm
1998:268). Two philosophers that have contributed to the notion of autonomy in
ethics, although in completely different ways, are Immanual Kant and John Stuart
Mill.
4.2.1 Autonomy in Kant's Ethics
Immanual Kant's formulation of ethics, focussed on three interrelated aspects,
namely the preservation of human freedom, the dignity of man and the idea that
moral obligation follows from reason (O'Neill, 1993:175). Kant argues that freedom
entails more than only freedom from external constraint (such as proposed by
Hume). He distinguishes between negative and positive freedom where negative
freedom can be understood as freedom from ''foreign causes". However, he states
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that a free will must be positively free and its "causality must be a capacity for
autonomy". Freedom is presupposed to belong to all rational agents, who are free to
apply their practical reason to direct the choice of moral principles. In the words of
Secker (1999:46), "if we have a rational will, or practical reason, then we are free in a
positive sense, and capable of autonomy and thus bound by morality".
From this it follows that a moral agent's actions can only be judged morally when the
moral agent chooses his/her actions freely on the basis of moral principles that were
also chosen freely. Moral agents thus have to be autonomous in that they can
choose their moral laws for themselves (Holm, 1998:268). However, these moral
laws cannot follow from any principle, the principles have to be universalizable - must
be able to serve all. Kant was committed to the identification of fundamental
principles of action that ought to be universally adopted, and for this, he relied on
rational procedures. He formulated the "Categorical Imperative" as the supreme
principle of morality. In its best known form, the Categorical Imperative states: "Act
only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal
law". Moral autonomy, according to Kant, is linked to conformity with this principle
and gives the moral agent freedom to act on objective, universally valid rules of
conduct derived by reason alone. Actions that are based on moral principles that
were not self-chosen (i.e. not legislated by reason) are heteronomous (Blackbum,
1996:31).
To act from duty is another distinguishing element of Kants' ethics. Each person has
the duty to try and perfect him/herself in order to attain moral autonomy, as well as a
duty to respect the moral autonomy of others (Holm, 1998:268). This second duty
follow from Kant's "Formula of the End in Itself' which states: "So act as to treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, never solely as a
means but always also as an end" (quoted by Norman, 1983:102). This second
order principle demands respect for persons - more specifically to respect (and leave
intact) other persons' capacities to act. Moral failure result when (1) others are used
as things or tools and not as agents and (2) by doing something to which others
cannot consent to. Kant does not appeal to consent as criterion of legitimate action,
but rather appeals to the universalizable moral principles that were identified by
rational beings (O'Neill, 1993:177-178). According to Kant a limited beneficence is
required and when others or oneself is treated as ends, it is regarded as a failure of
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imperfect duties. The moral implication of Kant's idea of respect for persons involves
both respect for the other party's liberty as well as their autonomy. It involves
"respect for the other person's own pursuit of his or her own ends through h~sor her
own free action, and I am to help in the promotion of those ends only in ways which
are compatible with that basic respect". Following from this, Kant also laid great
emphasis on the notion of human rights (Norman, 1983:121-122).
To conclude, according to Kant, the "autonomy of the will is that property (of the
rational will) by which it is a law to itself independently of any property or object of
volition". Having autonomy according to Kant, is to consider principles from a point of
view that requires temporary detachment from the specific desires and aversions a
person may have. Autonomy is an ideal feature of a person as moral legislator (Hill,
1991:45). Kant conceptualizes autonomy as moral autonomy where the focus is on
the individual and her decisions about what she wants for her life, instead it
addresses the moral question, "is this what one ought to do?" (Secker, 1999:48).
4.2.2 Autonomy in Kantian Ethics
Kantian ethics refers to a wide range of so-called "quasi-Kantian positions in ethics"
which may range from rights theories to action-based forms of thinking in which the
focus is on universal principles, respect for humans and human rights (O'Neill,
1993:183). One of the best-known forms of Kantian ethics can be found in John
Rawls' work on justice. His work contains a strong rejection of utilitarian thinking as
well as the centering of morality around a self-governing individual. According to
Rawls the issues and problems of justice are too complex for individuals to solve
independently. Instead, he argues for a social-contract basis for morality where
members of society should cooperate in equalizing the inequalities that result from
historical and biological factors. He uses a hypothetical social contract in which valid
principles are those to which we would all agree to if we could freely consider the
situation from the "original position". The original position refers to a standpoint from
where individuals are equally ignorant of particular individual characteristics, desires,
. interests and objectives. This position is aligned with Kant's conceptualization of
autonomy, since individuals give themselves moral laws from the perspective of
autonomy alone. Persons are regarded as autonomous in the original position
because they choose the moral law out of their nature as rational, independent and
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"mutually disinterested" persons (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:59-60; Schneewind,
1994:147).
In terms of the concept of autonomy, the Kantian position in biomedical ethics,
usually focuses on individual autonomy. As such, an autonomous person is
regarded as a free, independent, self-goveming individual who bases decisions on
rational reasons after effective deliberation. This person is free from physical or
psychological constraints and does not act or decide for emotional reasons (Secker,
1999:48). This conceptualization of autonomy is usually referred to in texts on
patient autonomy and respect for autonomy and will be elaborated on in chapter five.
4.2.3 The influence of J.S. Mill on conceptualizations of autonomy
Mill never used the term "autonomy" explicitly, but he did write extensively on
freedom and liberty. In his work "On Liberty" the extent of and limitations to the
individual's liberty is discussed especially as it pertains to the role of the state in
regulating the individual's actions.
Mill was in favour of freedom for all and regarded the individual as someone who has
absolute independence over himself - his own body and mind. He writes, "each
person is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and
spiritual" (Mill, 1996:16). This is however, only applicable to human beings that have
the necessary mental capabilities and therefore does not apply to children, those
under-aged according to the law, those who need to be taken care of by others and
"those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its
nonage" (1996:13). The only limitation to this freedom would come when the
individual may cause harm to someone else, and in these situations society would be
justified to interfere with the individual's liberty. Mill explicitly states that this limitation
does not apply to situations where the interference of society may prevent harm to
the individual. Mill therefore contributed to the idea of autonomy as freedom from
extemal constraint.
As a utilitarian, Mill was concerned about the promotion of ends and therefore
regarded the right action as the one that produced the greatest happiness for the
greatest number in a way that will promote quality of life. His work shows a shift
towards a qualitative notion of pleasure, as is clear in his famous claim: "It is better to
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be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied
than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because
they only know their side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows
both sides" (1996:vii). Mill regards the development of individuality as an essential
element of well being. He argues that respect for the liberty of others is valuable
since people prefer to be the authors of their own lives, they have a special interest in
and special expertise regarding their own lives. According to Mill utility is produced
as a by-product when people are allowed to develop their own lives. The conclusion
can be drawn that Mill did not view autonomy as valuable in itself, but rather that the
value of autonomy is situated in the utility, happiness and quality of life it directly and
indirectly produces (Holm, 1998:268).
4.2.4 Contemporary ideas regarding autonomy
Both Gerald Dworkin (1988:6) and Joel Feinberg (1989:28) discarded the idea that
autonomy has a single coherent meaning.
Feinberg (1989:28) describes the related notions that formulate the general
conception of what he refers to as "personal autonomy". The four meanings used to
describe autonomy are: (1) the capacity to govern oneself, (2) the actual condition of
self-government, (3) an ideal of character derived from that conception and (4) the
sovereign authority to govern oneself.
The right to self-governing is usually determined by the capacity to govern oneself,
which in tum is associated with the ability to make rational choices (infants, insane
persons, the comatose, the intellectually disabled, etc. are usually excluded).
Feinberg adopts the threshold conception of natural competence described by Daniel
Wikier. In contrast to the legal-like conceptions of competence, this account
describes a certain threshold above which people are regarded as competent.
Those who fall beneath the threshold are regarded as incompetent. Those above the
threshold may possess various natural abilities, in various degrees, one of which is
intelligence. Although this may enhance their decision-making abilities, it does not
render them more or less incompetent. In other words, the person whose relevant
capabilities are just above the threshold of competence may be regarded as qualified
for self-government, even though the person may rule herself badly, unwisely or
partially. Someone who falls beneath the threshold and therefore are genuinely
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incompetent, is incapable of making hislher own decisions - even "stupid ones"
(Feinberg, 1989:30).
According to Feinberg autonomy as condition requires aspects such as:
• Self-possession: The person is his/her own person, has a distinct self-identity
and does not belong to anyone else.
• Authenticity: The person has hislher own tastes, opinions, values, ideals and
preferences, and does not merely function as a mouthpiece for other people's
ideas. However, the person is not totally indifferent to the reactions of others,
and will subject hislher opinions and beliefs to rational scrutiny, and if necessary
alter these opinions for hislher own reasons.
• Self-creation (self-determination): The autonomous person is a "self-made" man,
in other words, has the habit of critical self-revision, instilled by significant others
and that results in a process of self re-creation. In other words, an autonomous
person continually integrates new experiences and old policies in a rational
manner to make "greater coherence and flexibility" (Feinberg, 1989:34).
• Self-legislation: In the work of Immanuel Kant, it is stated that man is only bound
by moral law if the law was legislated by his own free rational will. This idea was
further developed by Rawls' conception of autonomy as rational will. According
to Rawls the correct moral principles are those that we would consent to as free
and equal rational beings.
• Moral authenticity: The autonomous person's moral convictions and principles
are his/her own, derived from a committed process of continually reconstructing
the value system which s/he inherited. The autonomous person will only change
his/her principles and convictions after debate, argument and reflection and not
by means of coercion.
• Moral independence: An autonomous person should not be thought of as
someone who is maximally independent of the demands of others, a totally
uncommitted person. If autonomy is thought of as a condition that is an ideal
condition, there should not be conflict between moral autonomy as an ideal and
moral commitment.
• Integrity (self-fidelity): The autonomous person is faithful to his/her own
principles and therefore integrity presupposes moral authenticity. Yet, complete
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moral authenticity does not guarantee an unfailing integrity, because other
character traits may have a greater motivating power than moral principles.
• Self-control (self-discipline): An autonomous person governing him/herself is not
being governed by someone else (''from the outside"), but is in control of
him/herself, therefore governed from the "inside".
• Self-reliance: A person who is self-reliant does not rely on the commitments from
others to him and in other words are able to rely on himself when others fail. This
person has inner resources such as strength, courage, resilience, etc.
• Initiative (self-generation): The autonomous person has his/her own projects and
strategies and has his/her own "undertakings" and/or initiatives. The
autonomous person is not someone whose activities are solely determined by
others' proposals or initiatives.
• Responsibility for self: "De facto autonomy" is a conceptually presupposed
condition of most judgements of responsibility. If an autonomous person makes
a voluntary choice, that person also takes the responsibility for all the foreseeable
consequences that may follow his/her choice.
Feinberg (1989:43) defines autonomy as condition in a relatively vague fashion in
order to allow for flexibility. Yet, as an ideal, he is of the opinion that it needs to be
narrowed down in order to make it attractive, even though it will always be at best
only a partial ideal. Autonomy needs to be defined in ways that, with all other things
being equal, will regard 'to be autonomous' as the preferred state. He acknowledges
the role that communities and interactions between the individual and communities
play in limiting personal autonomy. Based on this given, Feinberg (1989:45) defined
the ideal of the autonomous person as "an authentic individual whose self-
determination is as complete as is consistent with the requirement that he is, of
course, a member of a community".
Dworkin (1988:10), attempts to analyze what an autonomous person is and largely
views (similar to Feinberg) autonomy as a moral, social and political ideal. He further
defines autonomy as "a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon
their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept
or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values. By
exercising such a capacity, persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence
to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are" (1988:20).
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Therefore, an autonomous person can rationally accept, identify with or repudiate a
lower-order desire or preference in a manner that is independent of the manipulation
of desires (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994: 122). Dworkin strongly argues that
autonomy is more than only the promotion or hindrance of first-order desires. Human
beings have the unique ability to reflect upon and adopt attitudes towards their first-
order desires and by leaving this out of an account of autonomy, according to him, is
to fail to capture an important aspect of human agency (1988:19).
Dworkin's theory of autonomy has received criticism for:
• the focus on second-order desires as an unnecessary complication of the theory,
since some second-order desires cannot be clearly distinguished from first-order
desires;
• the act of identification with a desire requires an independent act of identification
on a higher level. This may result in an infinite regress without ever reaching
autonomy;
• the theory lacks a way of allowing ordinary persons to qualify as deserving of
respect for their autonomy when they have not reflected on their preferences at a
higher level (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:122).
4.3 Respect for autonomy
The principle of respect for autonomy forms a central part of the so-called "principle
approach" to ethics. It supports the notion that it is not sufficient to regard people as
autonomous beings, but they should also be respected as such. Among other things,
respect for autonomy includes the acknowledgement of the person's right to have
his/her own opinions and views, to make choices and to act on personal values and
beliefs. People are not to interfere with others' personal affairs and also have the
obligation to maintain capacities for autonomous choice and to enhance people's
capacity for autonomy. Aspects such as informed consent, (in)competence,
decision-making and surrogate-decision-making are usually associated with this
principle and will receive more detailed attention in the following chapter.
4.4 Criticisms against an emphasis on autonomy
Traditional ethics consists of ethical systems that aim to discover, articulate and
interpret the ultimate moral principles that should govern someone's actions.
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Uneasiness with the emphasis placed on autonomy as a prerequisite for moral
standing or of respect for autonomy in these theories has been expressed by three
main groups, namely the feminists, the communitarians and non-American ethicists.
80th feminine and feminist ethics criticize the emphasis placed on autonomy in moral
theories. From the feminine ethics' point of view, moral theory has been developed
mainly by men with the result that the moral experiences and intuitions of women are
absent in the ethical theories. Only the male virtues, such as reason and rational
thought, are treated as being of philosophical interest or genuine moral worth
(Sherwin, 1992:47). It is especially the work of Carol Gilligan that contributed to the
notion that men and women have different "moral voices". According to her
research, when women are faced with moral decisions, they tend to focus on the
particular, expressing concern over special relationships and feelings, whereas men
are more concerned about the abstract duties and rules considered from an
impersonal perspective. The feminine ethicists argue that most women do not find
ethical models based on the image of an ahistorical, self-sufficient, atom-like
individual credible (Sherwin, 1992:47).
The feminist ethical perspective is in agreement with the feminine perspective that
personal feelings such as empathy, loyalty or guilt can play significant roles in moral
deliberations. However, feminist ethics have a very explicit political perspective in
which the oppression of women is regarded as morally and politically unacceptable
(Sherwin, 1992:52). The principles sought after by the "traditional ethics" are
regarded as universal and impartial, governing everyone irrespective of race, class
and gender and the persons they govern are supposedly autonomous (endowed with
enough knowledge and power to be able to decide for themselves what is right and
wrong) (Tong, 1993:11) Yet, in reality this is seldom the case. Gender, race and
class contribute to asymmetrical power relationships where people are not equal,
impartial, independent and autonomous. People often have varying degrees of
education and knowledge which is determined by asymmetrical power relations
informed by race, gender and class. A lack of education and knowledge, together
with relative powerless positions, make it problematic for many people to act
autonomously.
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Feminist ethics also rejects traditional ethical theory's emphasis on purely abstract
reasoning and the view of moral subjects as autonomous, rational, independent and
virtually indistinguishable form each other. People have historic roots and develop
special relationships within specific human contexts and therefore never function as
isolated individuals who can be totally setf-Iegislating. This objection to the primacy
of autonomy shows a strong resemblance with the communitarian critique against
autonomy.
Communitarianism first emerged as a critique of liberalism. From this perspective,
liberalism is criticized for its focus on an "impoverished view of human nature and
freedom". It is argued that the primacy of individual rights in the libertarian tradition is
setf-defeating, since liberalism neglects the social and cultural conditions necessary
for the emergence of strong individuals. More specifically, the communitarians attack
the liberal view for its reliance on an "atomistic conception of the self'
("unencumbered by essential attachments to others") and the commitment to
universality (Moon, 1998:553).
The communitarians find the focus on autonomy problematic because autonomy
presupposes an atomistic individualism where moral agents are seen as totally
separate from each other, able to function totally independently. According to the
communitarian point of view, people are social and historical creatures whose values,
capacities and identities result from being born and raised in particular communities.
People are therefore strictly speaking, not capable of independently choosing their
own moral principles and own conceptions of the good. A person's fundamental
aims and purposes are part of his identity that is socially constituted.
The other main criticism offered by the communitarian perspective against liberalism
is the focus on universality. Communitarians argue that it is not possible to identify a
set of universally valid principles, which are normatively binding at all times, places
and to all persons. People are historical and social beings whose moral lives are
constituted by the system of beliefs, concepts and values which make up a
"community's shared understandings". The focus of moral inquiry should be on these
shared understandings and not on identifying universal principles (Moon, 1998:555).
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A third strand of criticism comes from non-American countries who view the
emphasis on autonomy, and especially respect for autonomy as a reflection of
American society and its values. Since the principle of respect for autonomy forms
part of the principle-based approach to ethics (which is in turn informed by the
common morality), it is criticized for reflecting dominant principles in American
society, and not the principles that are valued in other regions or countries. The
emphasis on autonomy in the American health care system is practiced at the
expense of principles such as beneficence and justice which are valued in other
societies (Holm, 1998:272). Dickensen (1999:249) for example shows that Southern
Europe tend to follow a deontological code where patients have the positive duty to
maximize their own health and to follow doctor's orders. The physician is
constrained by professional norms, rather than by an emphasis on patient rights. In
the social welfarist models of the Nordic countries, the focus is on positive rights, and
entitlements to universalist healthcare provision. In the USA and some Western
European countries, liberal rights-based models are used where patients retain the
negative right to override medical opinion, even if his/her capacity is in doubt.
4.5 Autonomy and the intellectually disabled
All the accounts of autonomy described in this chapter view autonomy as an idealistic
principle, described in terms of complex cognitive capacities such as language and
self-consciousness, memory, logical relations, empirical reasoning about beliefs and
their validity and the capacity to use normative principles (Richards, 1981:6). These
required capacities necessarily exclude large numbers of people from reaching a
continuous state of full autonomy. Not only do people with the capacity to make
autonomous decisions sometimes fail to make autonomous decisions, but also
people who are generally regarded as not autonomous, can at times make
autonomous choices. This is especially true for the person with an intellectual
disability.
Depending on the degree of disability, some may not have any of the required
cognitive abilities to reflect, make decisions, or self-legislate whereas others may
have capacities to do so. The severely intellectually disabled may be able to indicate
a wish or preference of his/her own (first-order desires), but will not be able to reflect
rationally or critically on these desires. People with mild intellectual disabilities may
however be able to reflect to some extent on their first-order desires. Even despite
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the fact that people with intellectual disabilities cover such a wide range of
capabilities and decision-making abilities, they are often as a group regarded as
incompetent (falling below the threshold level of competence) and incapable of
autonomous agency and actions. This approach is supported by the following
remark from Beauchamp and Childress (1994:127), "the principle (of autonomy) is
not so broad that it covers nonautonomous persons. The principle should not be
used for persons who cannot act in a sufficiently autonomous manner (and cannot be
rendered autonomous) because they are immature, incapacitated, ignorant, coerced,
or exploited. Infants, irrationally suicidal individuals and drug-ctependentpatients are
typical examples". The individual (with an intellectual disability) and his/her abilities
to act as an autonomous agent who can make autonomous decisions, is often not
considered at all. Therefore the one approach to the question of autonomy and the
intellectually disabled, is to deny all people with intellectual disabilities autonomy, by
defining very stringent requirements for autonomous agency and decision-making.
However, these ideal notions of autonomy and autonomous decision-making, will
lead to the exclusion of many, since very few "normal" people will meet the stringent
requirements for autonomous agency. For example, in matters of procreation and
reproduction, many otherwise "autonomous" people will not base decisions about
having children on self-legislated principles, reached through a process of
deliberation and reflection. Rather, it could happen (and often does) through pure
biological and instinctual desires, without any rational thought entering the process.
Yet, people with intellectual disabilities are expected to adhere to these prerequisites
for autonomous decision-making. As mentioned by Beauchamp and Childress
(1994:123), any theory of autonomy that presents an ideal beyond the reach of
normal choosers is not acceptable and therefore not very helpful.
The opposite position is represented by the "evidentiary point of view", cited by
Ronald Dworkin (1993:223). According to this view autonomy should be respected
because each person knows what is in his own best interests better than anyone
etse. It is therefore better in the long run to recognize a general right to autonomy
which is always respected than by reserving the right to interfere with other people's
lives whenever it is thought that they have made a mistake. This view is also
supported by Tannsjo (1999), in his argument that autonomy should be respected in
all matters of procreation. Procreative decisions belong to the private realm and
should be respected as such. Therefore no-one should ever have to qualify in order
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to have children, and no-one (including the intellectually disabled) should ever be
involuntary sterilized because they are deemed unfit for parenthood. This
perspective rests on the assumption that autonomy should be respected, because it
protects the person's welfare. However, people often make unwise or foolish
decisions which are not in their best interest and not protecting their own welfare.
In contrast to the evidentiary view of autonomy, Dworkin adopts the integrity view of
autonomy (which is also the point of departure for the present study). According to
this viewpoint, autonomy protects the capacity to express one's own character. It
makes self-creation possible because it acknowledges a person's right to a life
structured by hislher own values. However, this argument requires that a person
must have the capacity that autonomy is supposed to protect. One of the
implications is that someone, who lacks this capacity, is still entitled to the right of
beneficence and that his preferences be considered, but he doesn't have the right to
make decisions contrary to his interests. In the words of Ronald Dworkin (1993:226),
"That may sound harsh, but it is no kindness to allow a person to take decisions
against hislher own best interests in order to protect a capacity he does not and
cannot have". The question to be answered then is, to what extend do people with
intellectual disabilities have a right to make autonomous decisions about
procreation?
4.6 Conclusion
The prominence of autonomy as a guiding ethical principle has received support in
the writings of people such as Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, Gerald Dworkin and Joel
Feinberg. It has also been criticized for being too American-centered, too masculine-
centered, too individualistic and not sensitive enough to the social and community
aspects of personhood. Many of the conceptualizations of autonomy also lean
towards the ideal notion of an autonomous agent as someone who is free from
outside influences, who is self-legislative, who reflects and deliberates on his/her own
moral principles and values and who is his/her own person. This ideal notion seems
to have limited usefulness in practice since it serves to exclude so many. People
with intellectual disabilities are usually assumed to be incapable of autonomous
decision-making and therefore not deserving of respect for autonomy. It was argued
that some people with intellectual disabilities might in fact be capable of autonomous
decision-making and therefore deserve to receive respect for their autonomy. How
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this should be applied to matters of procreation, remain to be discussed in the
fotlowing two chapters.
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CHAPTERS
THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY
5.1 Introduction
"Just as bioethics has tended to concentrate primarily on the rights of the competent
patient, so philosophical work has centered on the rights of competent persons and
the grounding of these rights in utility or in autonomy, rather than on decisions for
those who are incompetent. Although Mill said one can justifiably interfere with the
liberty of the incompetent, for their own good and to keep them from harming
themselves, it doesn't say which guidelines to use or which principles should be used
in those decisions. "
This quote of Buchanan and Brock (1989:3) is not only applicable to those who are
clearly incompetent to make autonomous decisions, but also to those who may be
competent at times (but not otherwise) or competent to make certain decisions (but
not others) for themselves.
The purpose of the present chapter is to explore the principle of respect for autonomy
and whether it can be applied to the intellectually disabled. Related aspects such as
paternalism and surrogate decision-making are also discussed.
5.2 Respect for autonomy: some initial considerations
Beauchamp and Childress (1994:123) describe autonomous agents as, "normal
choosers who act intentionally, with understanding and without controlling influences
that determine their action". To respect someone as autonomous therefore entails
the acknowledgement that decisions are up to the individual person and that other
parties should refrain from efforts to control those decisions (Hill, 1991: 47). Respect
for autonomy goes beyond a description of someone as autonomous
(mature/reflective/independent) towards the granting of a right to control certain
matters for him/herself without interference in the form of controlling threats and
bribes, manipulations and the willful distortion of relevant information (Hill, 1991 :48).
Yet, respect for autonomy does not entail unlimited freedom - if your autonomous
actions interfere with someone else's autonomy, or if your action is in conflict with
other moral principles, a limit may be placed on the extent to which your autonomy
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could be respected. Respect for autonomy is therefore a prima facie principle that
can be overridden by other competing principles, such as beneficence and
nonmaleficence.
Although certain limits may be imposed, respect for someone's autonomy generally
allows them to make their own decisions, even though these may be foolish, unwise
or irrational. In the words of T.E. Hill, "the right of autonomy allows people to make
their own choices, it does not dictate what those choices should be" (1991 :49).
However, if someone makes a choice or a decision that seems to be clearly self-
destructive, the health care professional is often faced with the dilemma of
reconciling respect for people's autonomous decisions with a real and deep concern
for their welfare. In these situations some will argue that paternalism is justified and
appropriate because either (1) the expressed preference is not a real preference or
(2) the person is not fully autonomous (or competent) and therefore it is not really
what the person wants (Harris, 1985: 195).
According to Harris (1985:196) there are four ways in which an individual's autonomy
can be undermined and diminished:
A Defects in control of own choices
• Where the preferences expressed are not necessarily the genuine
preferences of the individual due to e.g. mental illness.
• Where the person's behaviour is controlled by desires which the person
does not wish to have: e.g drug addiction where there is a tension
between the first order desire to have the drug and second-order desires
not to. Addiction itself is generally not regarded as destructive to
autonomy, only so when the agent wishes not to be addicted.
B Defects in reasoning
• Prejudice, beliefs and an uncritical conformity to traditional values can affect
reasoning. People should therefore be encouraged to establish their own
views and to discover their truth or validity for themselves.
• If a person bases choices on his/her own reasons for them, these reasons
should not reflect blind prejudice. In instances where the choices are based
on factual claims, there should be a proportionate relationship between the
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strength of the evidence for those facts and the strength of the beliefs they
support. Where the choice is based on an inference from facts or
propositions, that inference should be valid and logical.
• Defects in reasoning will only damage autonomy where the defects
undermine or tend to undermine the agent's capacity to make choices.
C Defects in information
• This can occur when beliefs or choices are based on false or incomplete
information, where the agent's own information gathering is at fault or where
the agent fails to understand the information or the significance thereof.
D Defects in stability
• People change over time and therefore their opinions and decisions may
also change. This is not sufficient grounds, though, to act
paternalistically.
If the principle of respect for autonomy is mainly concerned with obligations on the
part of health care professionals to enhance someone's capacity for autonomous
choice in ways that will respect autonomy and not interfere with the individual's
affairs (Christman 1989: 4), then these potential limitations to autonomy should be
actively addressed. One way to circumvent these potential limitations, is through the
practice of informed consent. Although informed consent has been designed to
protect autonomy and to enable autonomous choice, it also functions as a way of
protecting people from harm and to encourage professionals to act responsibly in
their interactions with patients (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:142).
5.3 Informed consent
According to Buchanan and Brock (1989:26), informed consent in medicine requires
the free and informed consent of a competent patient to medical procedures that are
to be performed. This entails the ideal of shared decision-making where patients
decide in collaboration with the health care professional about health care in ways
that will satisfy the patient's aims and needs. Informed consent is a temporal
process, where consent is given over time and can be withdrawn over time
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:143).
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In its general form, informed consent obligates professionals to: disclose information
to patients, ensure that the disclosed information is understood adequately and to
minimize any form of coercion so that the person can make a voluntary decision.
Beauchamp and Childress (1994:143) distinguish between (1) informed consent in
terms of the rules of consent in institutions and (2) informed consent of an autonomy-
based model. In the first instance, institutions have to obtain legally valid consent
before procedures can be performed. Therefore the physician who performs
procedures based on institutionally obtained consent, may not necessarily adhere to
the stringent standards of informed consent that stems from an autonomy-based
model.
The autonomy-based model represents a high standard of informed consent that can
only be obtained if a person, with substantial understanding and in a substantial
absence of control by others, intentionally authorizes a professional to do something
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:143). This distinction has significant implications for
the intellectually disabled. In the past, the intellectually disabled were usually
institutionalized and consent for the institutionalization was given by the legal
guardian or parent. As a result, this consent authorizes the institution to treat that
person in ways they see fit. In the past involuntary sterilization occurred mostly in
institutions, based on this form of informed consent. For the purpose of this
assignment, however informed consent in terms of the autonomy-based model will
be the main focus.
Beauchamp and Childress (1994:145-146) provide the following useful summary of
the elements of informed consent.
Threshold Elements (Preconditions)
1. Competence (to understand and decide)
2. Voluntariness (in deciding)
" Information Elements
3. Disclosure (of material information)
4. Recommendation (of a plan)
5. Understanding (of 3 and 4)
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III Consent Elements
6. Decision (in favour of a plan)
7. Authorization (of the chosen plan)
5.3.1 Competence
Although competence is cited as an element of informed consent, it usually acts as a
prerequisite element since it determines whether people are capable of adequate
decision-making or not. If not, a guardian or surrogate decision-maker can be
appointed to look after the person's interests.
Competence is a concept that refers to a person's ability for autonomous decision-
making. Competence is often described as an all-or-nothing concept - you are either
competent or incompetent. However, competence is also regarded as decision-
specifiC,in other words, a person can be competent to make a particular decision on
a specific time under specified circumstances and be incompetent under different
circumstances or conditions. Buchanan and Brock (1989:18) define competence
determination as "the determination of a particular person's capacity to perform a
particular decision-making task at a particular time and under specified conditions".
Competence therefore depends on the objective demands of the task including the
level and specific form of abilities to understand, reason and decide about the
options. A person's ability may fluctuate, due to e.g. dementia or an intellectual
disability or may be influenced by environmental factors (such as side-effects of
medications or stress) and the behaviour of others.
From a legal perspective, adults are usually presumed to be competent in making
decisions about health-care for themselves. In other words, the law assigns to adults
a global status of competence unless and until there has been a legal finding of
incompetence. In a similar fashion, people may also be legally declared as globally
incompetent. But, as cautioned by Buchanan and Brock, (1989:21), in borderline
cases, the assignment of competence and incompetence should always be regarded
as decision-specific. Thus, although people may be regarded as intellectually
disabled, and by law as globally incompetent, they may still be competent to make
decisions about certain aspects of their lives, themselves.
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The following capacities have been identified as requirements for competence (and
shows remarkable overlap with the descriptions of autonomy). However,
competence, unlike autonomy is not a matter of degree since you are either
classified as competent or incompetent (Buchanan & Brock, 1989:136).
• Understanding and communication: This refers to the various capacities that
allow someone to be involved in the process of becoming informed and
expressing a preference. It includes linguistic, cognitive and conceptual abilities
that will enable the person to receive and comprehend the information relevant to
the decision (Buchanan & Brock, 1989:23). It also involves an appreciation of
different alternatives and future states pertaining to the decision, such as to be
able to imagine what it would feel like and be like to be sterilized and not have
children or alternatively to not be sterilized and perhaps bear and raise children.
This requirement may be especially difficult for the intellectually disabled and
young children, who have had limited life experiences and cognitive abilities. The
information provided by the physician also needs to be understood and the
person's own preferences clearly communicated. In general, understanding
requires the capacities to receive, process and make available for use the
information relevant to particular decisions. The level of understanding will also
depend on the ability of the health care professional to explain abstract,
complicated and technical aspects clearly.
• Capacities for reasoning and deliberating. Not only is it necessary for information
to be understood, but sufficient short-term memory is needed to retain
information, especially since informed consent is a temporal process.
• A set of values or a conception of what is good that is at least minimally
consistent, stable and affirmed as the person's own.
• The capacity to intend a certain outcome.
• The capacity to freely communicate his/her wish to caregivers (Beauchamp &
Childress, 1994: 135).
Buchanan and Brock (1989:26) defends a threshold conception of competence,
according to which someone is regarded as either competent or incompetent to make
a specific decision. Competence is not regarded as a matter of degree, although the
underlying capacities needed to make the decision may be present in various
degrees. This requires, however, a standard of competence that can serve as a
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baseline against which to decide on someone's (in)competence to make a decision.
Yet, no standard for competence or defined set of procedures to determine
competence will guarantee that all and only the incompetent will be judged to be
incompetent.
The criteria for particular competencies vary according to the context, because the
criteria are relative to specific tasks. Therefore the level of competence required to
make a certain decision is relative to the complexity of the decision to be made. A
person can be viewed as competent to make decisions on certain things, whereas
incompetent to make others. Competence in one person can also vary over time
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:134).
In biomedical contexts a person is generally regarded as competent if s/he is able to
understand a procedure, to deliberate regarding the major risks and benefits and to
make a decision based on this deliberation. Yet, some people (such as someone
with a reduced IQ) can perform all of these functions and still be regarded as
incompetent (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994:36)
Other standards of competence have been suggested such as the ability to state a
preference (regarded as a weak standard of competence), the ability to understand
information and to appreciate one's situation, and the ability to reason through a
"consequential life decision" (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:137). The sliding-scale
strategy as a standard of competence, advocated by Buchanan and Brock (1989)
proposes that the level of competence required must shift according to the risk
attached to the decision. The rationale behind this strategy is that competence
determination is a way to protect people against decisions they make that are not in
their best interests. So, if a medical intervention has increased risk for patients, more
stringent levels of competence to elect or refuse the intervention should apply. If the
consequences for well being are not so compromised, the level of capacity required
for competence should be lowered. Thus the same person can be judged competent
and incompetent, depending on the risk involved in the decision.
All methods of setting standards of incompetence experience difficulties of whether to
emphasize the person's autonomy or to emphasize prevention from harm.
Beauchamp and Childress (1994:141) argue that competence is determined primarily
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by whether a person has the capacity to decide autonomously, and not by whether a
person's best interests are protected. They argue convincingly that the sliding-scale
strategy, although attractive, seems to be incoherent and tend to conflate riskiness
and complexity. The level of competence should increase with the complexity of the
decision to be made, not with the level of risk involved. Decisions with a high level of
risk do not necessarily require more ability than decisions with low risk.
Furthermore, decisions to override another person's choices should be distinguished
from questions of whether the person is competent or not. People seem to assume
competence whilst the decisions are in accordance with the health care
professional's recommendations. Yet, when the person's decision is in opposition to
the recommendations made, patemalism is often justified on the basis that the
person in question is actually incompetent. Paternalism is sometimes indicated,
even for the competent, but in these instances it should not be implemented and
defended on the basis of incompetence (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:141).
5.3.2 Voluntariness
The concept of voluntariness as an element of informed consent, refers to a person's
independence from manipulative and coercive influences. Therefore if someone
consented to or refused a procedure where that decision is based on threats,
manipulation or misrepresentation of information, the consent or refusal is regarded
as invalid. Feinberg (cited in Arneson, 1979:483), for instance, has a very strict
account of voluntariness and states, " one assumes a risk in a fully voluntary way
when one shoulders it while fully informed of all relevant facts and contingencies,
with one's eyes wide open, so to speak, in the absence of all coercive pressure of
compulsion. There must be calmness and deliberateness, no distracting or
unsettling emotions, no neurotic compulsion, no misunderstanding. To whatever
extent there is compulsion, misinformation, excitement or impetuousness, clouded
judgment (as e.g. from alcohol), or immature or defective faculties of reasoning, to
that extent the choice falls short of perfect voluntariness". He further argues that
agents can only take full responsibility for their actions when it adheres to these
requirements.
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The voluntariness with which someone makes decisions can therefore be diminished
by people, conditions such as a debilitating diseases, psychiatric disorders or drug
addictions (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:166). Different forms of influence have
been identified and it is important to note that not all forms of influence are controlling
or unwelcome. For example acts of loyalty, threats, education, lies, manipulative
suggestions and emotional appeals, vary in their impact on a person's decision.
Forms of influence that are usually not compatible with respect for autonomy, include
the following:
• Coercion occurs only if one person intentionally uses a credible and severe threat
of harm or force to control another. Both parties must believe that the person
making the threat can follow through on it, or the person making the threat must
successfully convince the other person that it can be done. No room for
autonomous decision-making is allowed.
• Persuasion occurs if a person is convinced to believe in something through the
merit of reasons put forward by another person. Non-rational and forceful
"persuasion" are forms of manipulation and not persuasion.
• Manipulation involves the swaying of someone to do what the manipulator wants
them to do by means other than coercion or persuasion. Especially informational
manipulation is often used such as lying, withholding information, providing
misleading information and exaggeration of information. All of these are
incompatible with autonomous decision-making (Beauchamp & Childress,
1994:164-165).
Some influences are however compatible with autonomous decision-making and
sometimes coercion and manipulation can be justified. For example when a person
welcomes reasoned arguments in favour of certain altematives because it provides
information central to understanding. A distinction between influencing by appealing
to emotion and influence by means of reason is needed, but difficult to determine.
Voluntariness becomes especially problematic in total institutions, especially where
people are admitted voluntarily. In institutions where people are admitted
involuntary, the threat of exploitation is often very real. To quote Beauchamp and
Childress (1994:168):
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The liberty of competent residents to live their lives in accord with their
preferences and life plans must often be balanced against protecting their
health, protecting the interests of others, promoting safety and efficiency in
the facility and allocating limited financial and other resources. Although
respect for autonomy suggests individualized care in the ways we expect
outside such institutions such care can rarely be individualized in the same
way.
The same will be true (maybe even to a larger extend) of people with intellectual
disabilities living in institutions. Although many of the intellectually disabled are
clearly incompetent with no clear life plans, unable to express preferences, and are
dependent on others to make all decisions for them, many may have preferences
and life plans, which have to be submitted to the welfare of others and the institution.
In the past the involuntary sterilization of women were often based on arguments
such as these.
Voluntariness as a prerequisite may be especially problematic with the intellectually
disabled person. Not only are they known for being easily persuaded or influenced
by people (especially caregivers) but they are also eager to please and not to anger
anyone. Due to their disability, they find themselves as relatively powerless in
asymmetrical power relationships, and therefore the level of voluntariness is often
compromised. To ensure voluntariness in decision-making may take time and effort
on the part of the health-care professional. Health-care professionals are often
confronted with family members who exert pressure on them as well as the disabled
person to consent to specific forms of treatment or prevention, such as sterilization.
These are often motivated in terms of real concerns for the person and are part of
attempts to take good care of them. However, it limits the possibility of informed
consent and autonomous decision-making.
5.3.3 Disclosure
The disclosure of relevant information by the' professional to the patient is often
regarded by professionals as the only requirement for obtaining informed consent.
Although this is clearly not sufficient, it does occupy a central position in the process
of informed consent since the professional person's perspective, knowledge and
recommendations are often essential for rational decision-making (Beauchamp &
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Childress, 1994:147). On a basic level, consent depends on disclosure of all the
relevant facts as well as other factors related to the treatment that may influence the
person's decision (Harris, 1985:206). Patients have the right to information and
according to Veatch (cited in Strong, 1979:290), whatever information a patient wants
should be divulged - no limits should be placed on information a person can obtain.
Normally the professional has to disclose information about:
• those facts or descriptions that people would usually consider material in deciding
whether to refuse or consent to the proposed intervention or procedure;
• information the professional believes to be material;
• the professional's recommendation;
• the purpose of seeking consent;
• the nature and limits of consent as an act of authorization.
How much information has to be shared, remains a controversial issue - especially
where information and knowledge may lead to an exacerbation of symptoms or risks.
It is also possible that the physician may decide to withhold some information as a
means to influence someone to consent to a certain procedure. Various standards of
disclosure of information have been suggested, including the professional practice
standard, the reasonable person standard and the subjective standard.
The professional practice standard views adequate disclosure as determined by a
professional community's customary practices. The doctor has to act in the patient's
best interest and has to divulge information accordingly. The reasonable person
standard uses the guideline of a hypothetical reasonable person. The authority is
therefore shifted towards the patient. Supporters of this standard believe that
obligations to respect autonomy outweigh obligations of beneficence and on balance,
the reasonable person standard better serves the autonomy of patients than the
professional practice standard. From the subjective standard of disclosure, the
adequacy of information is judged by reference to the specific informational needs of
the individual person, rather than the hypothesized reasonable person.
None of these standards of disclosure will be without significant problems, many of
which are discussed by Beauchamp and Childress (1994:147-150). They suggest
that disclosure should be achieved by means of active participation by patient and
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physician through the mutual exchange of information to facilitate the decision-
making process. In terms of sterilization, the information provided should include
information on the permanence of the operation, the risks and benefits thereof as
well as altemative forms of contraception.
5.3.4 Understanding of information and giving consent
Even after a thorough assessment of competence, creating a non-coercive
environment and divulging the required and requested information to the individual, it
is still possible that the person, although competent, may fail to understand all the
relevant information. It is generally assumed that the person shows understanding if
the person has acquired the significant information and demonstrates justified
relevant beliefs about the possible consequences of his/her actions. A complete
understanding is not necessary, but what is required is a basic understanding of the
diagnoses, the prognoses, the nature and purpose of interventions, different
alternatives and the risks and benefits attached to these as well as the physician's
recommendations (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:157). The patients have to
communicate their understanding of what they are consenting to, so that their level of
understanding can be assessed.
There may be various reasons why people do not demonstrate a proper
understanding, even though they are regarded as competent. As stated by
Beauchamp and Childress (1994:158), some people have a "very limited knowledge
basis", which makes it difficult for them to explain complex constructs and ideas. In
South Africa with its high levels of illiteracy and vast numbers of people with limited
formal educational backgrounds, this is especially true. The problem is further
exacerbated by language differences, where the majority of physician-patient
communication is conducted by means of a second or third language. Furthermore
the large power differential between the medical professionals and patients may
cause patients to be anxious and unsure of their abilities to explain their
understandings of material presented. These potential stumbleblocks highlight the
importance of clear and understandable communication between the professional
and the patient. In terms of the intellectually disabled, communication may be
experienced as very difficult and challenging, especially if the health care
professional has limited experience in this field.
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Another potential limitation is inadequate information processing. Where people are
faced with information overload, selective perception and processing of information
takes place with the effect of information being distorted, selectively remembered or
unattended to. According to Beauchamp and Childress (1994:159) this occurs
especially where information about risks are involved. In terms of sterilization, if the
health care professional inform the person that the procedure renders a person
permanently sterile, although in some cases, it has been successfully reversed, a
person can easily process the information selectively and only remember that it can
be reversed.
Problems of non-acceptance and false belief are a further complication in people's
understanding of information. Therefore, even if someone understands or
comprehends the information provided, the person may still not accept the
information as true. For example people diagnosed as HIV+ sometimes refuse to
believe the test result, even though they understand what the result means and how
it was obtained. The physician is then confronted with the problem of whether the
person's autonomy should be respected or not. Some would argue that the person's
wish for no further information should be respected, whereas others feel more
information can be justifiably imposed.
5.4 Paternalism
The principle of respect for autonomy strongly suggests that society should never
tolerate people who are adult and capable of making their own autonomous
decisions, to be coerced into accepting any kind of care. Yet, sometimes people
make decisions that are clearly not in their best interests or that may even be
harmful. This may leave the physician with the dilemma of choosing between
respecting the person's autonomy, or acting paternalistically in efforts to adhere to
the principle of beneficence.
In its broadest terms, paternalism refers to "government as by a benign parent".
Traditionally the parent has the right and duty to overrule their child's preferences in
the name of their real or true best interests - interests the child may not be mature
enough to perceive (Blackburn, 1996:279). According to the definition of the Oxford
English Dictionary, paternalism is, "intentional nonacquiescence in another person's
preferences, desires, or actions with the intention of either avoiding harm to or
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benefiting the person". This definition allows for paternalism to include both the
overriding of intentions, preferences or actions for substantially autonomous
decisions as well as overriding those decisions which do not stem from autonomous
decision-making (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:274). Not all authors agree with this
conceptualization: some argue that paternalism is only justified for people incapable
of reaching autonomous decisions (Tënnsjë, 1999:24) and not for instances where
the paternalist can show no defect in the other person's autonomy (Harris,
1985:201). Furthermore, according to Harris, paternalism is only justified when a
defect in the decision-making process is relevant to the particular decision to be
made, and then paternalism can only be justified for so long as it takes to apprise the
agent of the defects in his decision (1985:201).
Whether paternalism is ever justified for those who are substantially autonomous
seems to be a debatable issue. Feinberg addressed this by drawing a distinction
between strong and weak paternalism. Weak paternalism occurs when a physician
intervenes on the grounds of beneficence or nonmaleficence only to prevent
"substantially nonvoluntary conduct". In other words to protect people against their
own non-autonomous actions (such as may be the case for people with intellectual
disabilities) and therefore takes competence and ability into account. Strong
paternalism refers to interventions by the physician which are intended to benefit a
person where the person's choices and actions are informed and autonomous, albeit
risky and harmful.
Weak paternalism usually does not require strong evidence to be convincing. It is
generally agreed that people need to be protected from harm that may result to that
person from conditions that are beyond hislher self-control. In cases where
someone's autonomy is questioned, patemalism cannot threaten respect for their
autonomy, since no substantial autonomy exists. However, in terms of strong
paternalism, the autonomy of individuals are not respected and according to some
writers, it violates individual rights and restricts people's free choice. Most writers
reject strong paternalism, although some will justify it by means of appeals to
beneficence and/or consent. For instance, Dworkin argues that paternalistic
restrictions is justified when the person being coerced would have consented to the
restriction if he were rational (Arneson, 1979:470). He further argues that
paternalism may heighten a person's ability to lead a "rationally ordered life" and
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does not necessarily compromise or diminish someone's autonomy. It is therefore
possible that paternalism can "preserve a wider range of freedom to the individual"
(Husak, 1980:29). Feinberg argued that in terms of legal paternalism, the state has a
right to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct, only when it is substantially
nonvoluntary or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is
involuntary or not (Arneson, 1979:470).
As argued by Beauchamp and Childress (1994:282), acts of strong paternalism are
sometimes needed and justified if one adheres to the principle of beneficence.
Although these writers do not advocate paternalism as a state/institutional policy,
they stipulate that the following conditions need to be satisfied if-strong patemalistic
acts are to be committed:
• a person is at risk of a significant, preventable harm;
• the paternalistic action will probably prevent the harm;
• the projected benefits to the person of the paternalistic action outweigh its risks to
the person;
• the least autonomy-restrictive alternative that will secure the benefits and reduce
the risks is adopted;
In his book entitled, Coercive Care (1998:6), Torbjorn Tannsië argues that coercive
care can err in two ways: (1) by allowing freely coercive care where it should be
prohibited and (2) being too restrictive in allowing coercive care where it ought to
take place. This is especially true for the intellectually disabled. On the one hand
we want to respect autonomous decision-making (and refrain from acting
paternalistically) for those individuals with intellectual disabilities, who are competent
and can exercise autonomous decision-making in certain situations about certain
aspects. On the other hand, one needs to be careful not to focus so exclusively on
the principle of respect for autonomy that people who are not substantially
autonomous are harmed by a lack of (weak) paternalistic intervention.
To conclude, in general, autonomous people should not be coerced into accepting
any medical interventions they do not want, even if it is in their own best interest or in
the best interest of others. This extends to people, capable of autonomous decision-
making who did not want to exercise autonomous decision-making or did not bother
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to do so (Tënnsjo, 1998:9). However, since it is possible, that some people are
incapable of reaching autonomous decisions, the decision-making responsibility can
and should be transferred onto someone else to act as surrogate.
5.5 Surrogatedecision-making
Surrogate decision-makers reach decisions for people who are nonautonomous or
for those individuals whose autonomy is doubtful. Buchanan and Brock (1989:87-88)
developed a theory of surrogate decision-making with the underlying values of
respect for individual self-determination, concern for the individual's well-being and
distributive justice. The three possible "guidance principles" suggested are, the
advance directive, the substituted judgment standard and the best interest standard.
The advance directive standard applies where someone who has been autonomous
and competent before, made hislher wishes regarding treatment known (whilst being
fully autonomous) or appointed someone specifically to act as a surrogate to make
these decisions on hislher behalf. For people with intellectual disabilities, decisions
about future medical treatments, such as life-sustaining treatment, are such complex
decisions to make, that most of them will not be regarded as competent or
autonomous to make that kind of decision. Therefore it is highly unlikely that they will
be able to formulate advance directives of any sort.
The substituted judgment standard instructs a surrogate to choose as the person
would choose if the person was competent, informed of all the medical information
and options and knew that he/she is incompetent Similar to the advance directive
standard, it attempts to preserve and acknowledge autonomous decision-making.
The substituted judgment standard is however problematic, since it is very difficult for
anyone to imagine or decide what the person with a moderate to severe intellectual
disability would have wanted if they were competent, since they have never been
competent to indicate their wishes and preferences in any substantial way. Although
it may be technically possible for the mildly disabled to be competent to make certain
decisions, and therefore a surrogate should be able to make a substituted judgment
decision, it opens up possibilities for considerable abuse. In agreement with
Beauchamp and Childress (1994:173) it is suggested that substituted judgment
should not be used for people who have never been competent, and even for those
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who have been competent, it should preferably be substituted for the "pure autonomy
standard" or the best interest standard.
The best interest standard states that a surrogate must choose whichever will best
serve the person's interests or will maximally promote the person's good.
The term "best" implies (1) that some interests are more important than others since
they make a larger contribution to the persons "good" and (2) a particular decision
can advance some of the person's interests while it frustrates others (Buchanan &
Brock, 1989:94). This standard requires the surrogate to determine the net benefit
for the person of each option, "assigning different weights to the options to reflect the
relative importance of the various interests they further or thwart, then subtracting
costs or 'disbenefits' from the benefits for each option". The alternative to implement
then, is the one with the greatest net benefit to the person (Buchanan & Brock,
1989:123). From this calculation it follows that the mere fact that an alternative may
benefit the person, is not sufficient in deciding in favour of that alternative. The net
benefits for each alternative have to be calculated. The best interest standard
therefore relies heavily on the notion of quality of life. Quality of life decisions are not
about what the person would have wanted, or the person's social worth, but about
the value of life for the individual who must live it, not the value hislher life has for
others (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:180; Buchanan & Brock, 1989:123).
According to Buchanan and Brock (1989:123-124), ''for those with severely reduced
capacities, life may be worth living if there is a balance of simple pleasures or
contentment over pain and discomfort".
Problems associated with the best interest standard mainly centre around the idea
that values may enter the decision-making process which are not relevant to the
person's benefits or burdens. It is suggested by Buchanan and Brock (1989:180)
that judgments about benefits and burdens should focus on ''tangible factors" such as
physical suffering and medical diagnosis, and should be extended into other domains
only with hesitation and great caution. This seems to be especially the case with
predicting future emotional or psychological harm and/or suffering that may result.
Another potential problem is the extent to which the interest of others should be
considered in determining the person's best interests. For example, when women
with intellectual disabilities are given Depo Provera routinely from the onset of
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menstruation in order to cease menstruation (even though menstruating does not
seem to be a problem for the woman herself) because caregivers find it stressful,
difficult or inconvenient to manage the menstruation. Some may argue that it is in
the woman's best interest, because the less the strain on the caregivers, the better
the care she will receive. Similar arguments can be made to justify certain
treatments for people in institutional care. Although one may be sympathetic towards
the caregivers and the stresses they experience, when the best interest standard is
applied by the surrogate, the interests of the individual is the central concem, not the
interests of others.
The decision as to who should act as the surrogate decision-maker seems to vary
according to the type of decision to be made. Generally speaking, the surrogate
should be competent to make reasoned judgments and decisions, should possess
the necessary knowtedge and information, has to be emotional stable and must show
a commitment to the incompetent person's interests that is free of conflicts of interest
and of controlling influence by those who may not act in the person in question's,
best interests (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994~244).
Usually the closest family member is regarded as the first choice of surrogate.
Family members are assumed to have a special interest in their relatives, have
intimate knowledge of that person and are usually committed to furthering the
person's welfare. However, instances may exist where this is not the case, and
therefore the family as surrogate is not a given - especially where the family may
have a conflict of interest in the decision to be made. As far as the intellectually
disabled is concerned, the closest family member, legal guardian or primary
caregiver (where close family members are not available) usually take responsibility
for decision-making about all health-related and financial matters. However, in
decisions about preventive measures, such as sterilization, it raises questions about
the role their own interests may play in having the person sterilized and whether they
atone should be able to authorize this type of procedure. As was mentioned in
chapter three, the parents of intellectually disabled girls strongly favoured sterilization
(preferably by means of hysterectomies), in order to manage menstruation more
effectively and consequently lessen the burden of care-taking.
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Health care professionals can also play a significant role in helping families with
decision-making whilst protecting the patient's well-being and best interests. They
are valuable in terms of their expertise on medical matters such as the involved risks
and benefits and are usually motivated by the principles of beneficence and
nonmaleficence. However, few physicians in South Africa have adequate experience
in working with the intellectually disabled and have little experience in communicating
with them. The anxiety attached to this may cause the professional to focus on the
caretaker's position, rather than the position of the person in question or that
decisions regarding competence are made prematurely. Furthermore, in the past
(and even more recently), sterilization abuse was often initiated and carried out by
health care professionals.
In situations where health professionals and surrogates disagree as to the course of
action, institutional ethics committees and courts of law can have a valuable role to
play. These committees can facilitate decision-making among professionals and
surrogates and may also serve the function of monitoring professionals' conduct.
However, sometimes significant disagreements arise within these committees,
responsibility is often diffused and some powerful groups may "hijack" the process for
the furthering of their own agendas. These committees usually have limited or no
legal power to settle matters and therefore are limited in what they can do. In terms
of judicial processes, courts can be helpful to reach final decisions in controversial
matters or can provide additional safeguards where people have no relatives and are
institutionalized (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994:147-149). However in South Africa,
it is expensive, time-consuming and often only within the reach of a privileged few.
Decisions about sterilization of the intellectually disabled should preferably not reside
with one person or authority only. Decision-making in this regard (if ever indicated)
should include the health care professional as well as a mental health professional,
the family member or caretaker, representatives of the institutional ethics committee
and possibly representatives of consumer advocacy groups.
5.6 Respect for autonomy and the intellectually disabled
The worldwide policies of deinstitutionalization, normalization and integration
encourage the intellectually disabled to become fully-fledged members of society.
Yet, as argued in chapter three, they are usually not awarded respect and
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acknowledgment of autonomous decision-making powers concomitant with
community living. In the past, tt was automatically assumed that anyone with an
intellectual disability, by means of class membership, are non-autonomous and
therefore globally incompetent to make autonomous decisions. Consequently
respect for autonomous decision-making was viewed as an inappropriate principle in
considerations of ethical matters pertaining to the intellectually disabled. Instead, the
principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence were strongly favoured with the
accompanying practices of paternalism and surrogate decision-making. Whilst
acknowledging that many people with intellectual disabilities (especially the severely
disabled) are incompetent and need to be cared for in ways that will serve their best
interests, this does not automatically apply to all intellectually disabled individuals.
In the past these assumptions about the global status of incompetence (of the
intellectually disabled), often led to practices that denied all of them, all forms of
autonomous decision-making, even about relatively simple and uncomplicated
matters. In chapter four tt was argued that some individuals wtth intellectual
disabilities could at times make autonomous decisions about some aspects
concerning their lives and that the requirements for autonomous action should be
applied equally to all - it should hot be made more stringent for the intellectually
disabled. The principle of respect for autonomy (also for the intellectually disabled),
obligates the physician or health care pr.ofessional to actively enhance people's
capacity for autonomous choice in ways that will respect autonomy and not interfere
with their affairs (Christman, 1989:4). The principle of respect for autonomy, as
described in the foregoing section, can be applied to all who are regarded as
autonomous, even some people who are intellectually disabled.
At first glance, respect for autonomy seems to be a relatively simple and
straightforward process: the health care professional simply has to apply the same
guidelines stipulated in the first part of this chapter, (and used for "normal" people) to
the intellectually disabled. Although the same guidelines do (and should) apply, the
application thereof is not such a simple process at all. For instance, most people of
normal intelltgence are presumed to be competent and capable of autonomous
decision-making, until proven otherwise. The intellectually disabled, suspected or
known to have a lower IQ, is presumed to be incompetent, until convincingly proven
otherwise. The burden of proof in terms of competence seems to be shifted away
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from the professional to the individual. The onus lies with the individual to show
"beyond a reasonable doubt" to the physician that slhe is competent to make a
certain decision. This constitutes a discriminatory practice towards the intellectually
disabled - especially if it is accepted that they have equal moral status to other
human beings and are equally deserved of respect (as argued in chapter three). If
the principle of respect for autonomy is to be applied to the intellectually disabled,
this is the first significant shift that has to take place in the approach taken by the
health care professional.
The second important aspect to keep in mind, is that obtaining informed consent is a
process in time, not a once-off conversation. The focus on the process-nature of
informed consent is especially important with the intellectually disabled. They are
often scared and shy in front of strangers, especially people in authority positions.
Time is needed to build a trusting relationship, where information can be adequately
and repeatedly shared and comprehended. Due to shyness or frightfulness, the
impression can easily be created that they do not understand the information given to
them or that they cannot deliberate rationally. Especially where the procedure to be
performed is not a medical emergency (such as sterilization), adequate time should
be set aside for multiple consultations on the matter. Contraceptive sterilization is
not a medical emergency.
One of the major limitations, especially in South Africa, is that few health care
professionals have had adequate experience in working with the intellectually
disabled. In the U.K. for example, psychologists can only register with the British
Psychological Society, once they have completed an approved 6-month practical
during which they work exclusively with the intellectually disabled. SimilaF
requirements do not exist in South Africa. Many psychologists and medical doctors
have never had any personal contact, communications with or adequate knowledge
of intellectual disabilities, yet, they are the ones expected to make crucial decisions
about these people's level of competence. Therefore, the third important aspect in
this regard is that people involved in making decisions about the intellectually
disabled, need to have experience in working with them, or at least be working under
close supervision. Experience in communicating with them, determining their
preferences and wishes and being able to explain complicated terminology in
understandable ways, are important skills to be developed and practiced. First-hand
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contact and experience often also serve the function of removing and/or lessening
the stigma and biases professionals may have against the disabled.
Although the ideal of autonomous decision-making for the mildly intellectually
disabled, may seem like a worthwhile idea, it doesn't amount to much if the attitudes
towards their upbringing and education do not reflect similar values. Similar to
children of normal intelligence, the intellectually disabled also need to be given
progressively more autonomous decision-making opportunities, whilst taking the
responsibility for the consequences of the decisions they make. Lafollette
(1999:139), distinguishes between normative and descriptive autonomy. He
suggests that young children should be granted circumscribed normative autonomy
although they do not meet all the requirements for descriptive autonomy. In other
words they should be trained to become autonomous and this requires parents and
caregivers to treat them in some respects as if they were already descriptively
autonomous. He suggests three different stages of circumscribed normative
autonomy:
1. Administrative autonomy, where the child has a sense of making some
choices and take responsibility in small matters. The parents or care-takers
are always ready to step in if necessary.
2. Monitored autonomy, where the child is given greater choices and greater
responsibilities, and to some degree the child has to cope with the
consequences. However, the parents are still there to intervene if necessary.
3. Minimally constrained autonomy, where the child makes more choices with
much less interference from parents.
Although Lafollette developed this model for children of normal intelligence, it seems
to be useful in fostering autonomy in those with intellectual disabilities as well.
Granted, people with severe intellectual disabilities, will seldom be able to move
beyond the level of administrative autonomy, but at least their "autonomous"
preferences will be acknowledged. It is not expected of people with normal
intelligence to develop autonomous decision-making abilities instantaneously, why
should it be any different for the intellectually disabled? This process of acquiring
and promoting autonomy should ideally be applied in educational settings, institutions
and homes of the intellectually disabled. It requires a significant shift in attitude and
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values of the caretakers who often resist the emphasis on autonomy. Caring for the
intellectually disabled (as with children), is often easier if the caretaker can take all
decisions on behalf of that person. Limited resources to support autonomy and
community living, is also cited as reasons why autonomy should not be encouraged.
However, if deinstitutionalization, integration and normalization is taken seriously, the
promotion of autonomy for those for whom it is appropriate (e.g. the mildly disabled),
is important.
Finally, what is argued for, is not a strict adherence to the principle of respect for
autonomy, but a prima facie adherence. Just as it is not acceptable to view all
intellectually disabled persons as incompetent and nonautonomous by means of
class membership, it is unacceptable to regard all of them as autonomous and
competent to make all of their own decisions. Respect for autonomy protects the
individual's self-determination ability, which in tum presupposes the development of
the capacities necessary for reflective choice. But, if a person does not have these
capacities and the ability to determine their own life-course is compromised, the
principle of respect for autonomy becomes redundant. The value of choosing for
oneself and acting autonomously diminishes proportionately with the ability to do so
(Buchanan & Brock, 1989:39). Therefore, for the severe/profound intellectually
disabled, it will be appropriate to appoint a surrogate to make most health care
decisions for them, especially since their capacities for communication,
understanding and deliberation are so limited. Yet, their competence still needs to be
determined on an individual basis before a surrogate can be considered to make a
specific decision.
5.7 Conclusion
Adherence to the principle of respect for autonomy can be a valuable point of
departure in discussions about decision-making and the intellectually disabled. Not
only does it draw attention to the fact that many individuals who are mildly to
moderately intellectually disabled, can make autonomous decisions at certain times
regarding specific aspects of their lives, but it also compensate for the imbalances of
the past, caused by global assignments of competence and incompetence. In the
past, respect for autonomy and the intellectually disabled have been treated as totally
irreconcilable concepts. Yet on closer analysis, respect for autonomy, especially
through means of informed consent, is an attainable goal for people with mild and
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even moderate intellectual disabilities, though it may be time-consuming,
cumbersome and an inconvenient process for the professionals involved.
Important though, is that the principle of respect for autonomy has only prima facie
standing - what is argued for is not a strict adherence to this principle, but a prima
facie one. Some people with intellectual disabilities do not have any of the abilities
required to exercise any form of autonomous decision-making. To ignore these
limitations and allow them to suffer because of decisions they made (which they were
not actually competent to make), can not be justified. In these instances weak
paternalism should be allowed and surrogate decision-makers appointed to look after
their best interests and well-being. The remaining question to be addressed then is,
how can the principle of respect for autonomy be applied to decisions about
procreation and specifically to the sterilization of the intellectually disabled?
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CHAPTER6
RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY, STERILIZATION AND THE INTELLECTUALLY
DISABLED
6.1 Introduction
Liberal individualism, especially in the form of rights theory, attaches importance to
the individual's pursuit of personal projects and initiatives, with no or very little
interference by the state or other authorities. Procreative rights as a liberty right,
usually regard matters of reproduction as private. The individual's autonomy is
respected in decisions as to whether slhe wants to have children and how those
children should be raised and cared for. Interference in autonomous decision-
making regarding parenting is usually only permitted once the child is abused or
severely neglected by the parents. However, through policies of involuntary
sterilization, the state owns itself the right to interfere in matters of procreation where
the intellectually disabled is concerned.
The current chapter gives an overview of procreative rights and attempts to analyze
the reasons usually offered for state interference in procreative matters of the
intellectually disabled, with special reference to involuntary sterilization. This will be
done from the perspective offered by the principle of respect for autonomy. It is
argued that adherence to the principle of respect for autonomy precludes the
involuntary sterilization of any person, including the intellectually disabled.
6.2 Procreativerights
According to Mercer (1999:328) an essential assumption of liberalism is that the
good life stems from freedom granted to the individual to choose his/her own way of
life. A liberal society is mainly concerned with respect for persons and respect for
their autonomous choices, even if these may be terribly wrong, silly or foolish. One
area of life, in which the individual's autonomous decisions are usually respected, is
that of procreation. Procreative rights are regarded as inviolable: the right to have
children is seen as belonging to the private realm, hidden and protected from public
interference. Normally no one has to "qualify" to become parents, and only once it
has been proven that a person is incapable of parenting, can children be removed
from their care. Even in these circumstances, the removal is often only temporary
and the children returned to their biological parents once the parents have been
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"rehabilitated". Torbjërn Tannsjë (1999:71) argues that a general right to procreate
should be safeguarded by society, but not a general right to one's children.
Exceptions to the rule that people need not "qualify" to become parents usually
include people applying for adoption and people applying for fertility treatment. In
these instances prospective parents are assessed and evaluated to determine their
competence and suitability to become parents - a practice inconsistent with the
procreative freedom granted to natural parents. This discrepancy between
procreative rights of natural parents and people applying for adoption is usually
explained and justified in terms of the fact that with adoptive parents a wide range of
suitable parents are available to a child already in existence. Therefore it is possiele
to harm the child (or at least not benefit him) when attempts are not made to choose
the most suitable parent among those available. In contrast, a child not bom yet
cannot benefit nor be harmed from life being conferred upon him by hislher biological
parents (Cartwright, 1994:82; Harris, 1983:222).
Justification for the right to a private and autonomous relationship between parents
and children, according to Schoeman (1980:6), stems from the importance of
intimate relationships in general. The family is entitled to the right of privacy and
parents are entitled to exclude others from "scrutinizing obtrusions" into family
occurrences. He further argues that the right to autonomy entitles the adults in the
family to make decisions about the kinds of influences they want their children to
experience and further entitles them wide latitude in remedying what they regard as
faults in their children's behaviour. Yet, neither the right to privacy, nor the right to
autonomy associated with the family, is absolute. According to Wald, cited in
Schoeman (1980:10), coercive state intervention in family life is only allowed when,
(1) serious physical or emotional harm to the child is imminent, and (2) the
intervention is likely to be less detrimental than the status quo. The relatively narrow
margins within which state intervention is justified, follows from practical aspects
such as:
• Typically good altematives to unfortunate family circumstances are not available
(many instances of child sexual abuse occur in foster homes).
• It is difficult to predict which circumstances will have harmful long-range effects.
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• There is a lack of consensus about proper methods of child-rearing and the ideal
end product of child rearing.
• Our social commitment to diversity of life-styles requires a great deal of tolerance
in what should be permitted.
The libertarian ideas about privacy, autonomy and self-determination in procreative
matters may be regarded as praiseworthy. However, most of the arguments in
favour of these policies of non-interference seem to be quickly dismissed in
considerations about the intellectually disabled prospective parent. Involuntary
sterilization provides us with one example where the intellectually disabled is
automatically excluded from procreative rights, despite the fact that the person in
question may be interested in becoming a parent and may be competent to make
that decision. The "practical aspects" such as whether good alternative care is
available, whether it is possible to predict future well being of children raised in these
circumstances and tolerance for variety of life styles seem to disappear when
intellectual disability appears. Many of the "interferences" in the lives of the
intellectually disabled are well meant and motivated by a real concern for their
welfare as well as that of children to be born to them. However, more recently some
authors have argued that the principle of respect for autonomy precludes the
involuntary sterilization of anyone. State interference is only permissible if it can be
clearly and convincingly shown that the parent is unable to care adequately for the
child. In these instances, interference is limited to the removal of the children from
the parent's care and does not include the involuntary prevention of pregnancies
(Tanssjë, 1998;1999).
6.3 Sex,autonomy and the intellectually disabled
Since the realization of parenthood usually presupposes the occurrence of sexual
intercourse, it is necessary to address the issue of autonomy and sexual relations
where the intellectually disabled is concerned. Section 3.3.3 dealt with some of the
issues pertaining to sexuality, and therefore this section will attempt to elaborate on it
further by adding the perspective from autonomy.
The libertarian position views sex as morally permissible if and only if it is
consummated with mutual and voluntary informed consent. According to Beiiiotti
(1993:319) ''the test of morally permissible sex is: have the parties, possessing the
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basic capacities necessary for autonomous choice, voluntarily agreed to a particular
sexual interaction without force, fraud, and explicit duress?" Consequently, where
one or more parties lack the capacities for informed consent or where the consent is
not given voluntarily, sex is regarded as impermissible (Belliotti, 1993:320). Sexual
intercourse therefore presupposes that it takes place between two willing and
consenting people.
Providing informed consent for sexual intercourse is dependent on the general
requirements for informed consent (as described in chapter five), such as
competence, voluntariness, the disclosure of material information which has to be
adequately understood, the making of a decision and the authorizing of the chosen
course of action. The level of competence required to provide consent is determined
by the complexity of the decision to be made and require among other things the
capacities for understanding, reasoning, deliberating and the capacity to
communicate decisions. The provision of informed consent for sexual relationships
probably does not require the high level of competence needed for consenting to
surgical procedures or entering legal contracts, but also does not constitute a
decision as simple as stating a preference.
The results of the study by Roelofse and Kleintjes (1995) on informed consent (see
tables 1 and 2 on pp. 31-34), clearly show that the moderate lower to profoundly
disabled will probably not be able to meet the level of competence required for
providing informed consent for sexual intercourse. Although competence always has
to be determined on an individual level, it is highly unlikely that people with these
levels of disability will be found competent to decide on participation in sexual
intercourse. This raises the question whether people who are disabled to the extent
that they cannot give informed consent for sexual intercourse, should be allowed to
engage in sexual practices that involve other people. Especially since sexual
intercourse poses serious risks such as HIV infection, sexually transmitted infections
and pregnancy - risks which people with severe intellectual disabilities probably will
not understand nor be able to apply appropriately in providing or withholding consent.
Another interesting finding reported in table 3 (p.35) is that people falling within the
range of severe upper to moderate lower disabilities, are unlikely to become
"orogenitally active" unless they are introduced to it by someone else. This finding
demonstrates (1) their extreme vulnerability to be sexually coerced and exploited by
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others, and (2) that if they need to be protected (paternalistically) from becoming
involved in sexual intercourse, it most probably will seldom be necessary.
Furthermore, this restriction on sexual intercourse does not limit them from
expressing their sexuality in other ways, such as self-stimulation. The position taken
here is in contrast with the idea that the intellectually disabled should be allowed to
express their sexuality freely. Protecting and restricting them from sexual intercourse
(and sexual practices which involve other people), for which they are not competent
to provide consent, acknowledges the right of the intellectually disabled to be
protected from exploitation and abuse. Weak paternalistic intervention in the form of
prohibiting engagement in sexual intercourse is necessary for some people with
severe to profound intellectual disabilities in order to serve their best interests.
Competence (and not incompetence), in these instances should always be assumed
until convincingly proven otherwise and always has to be determined on an individual
level - it should never be based on class membership.
Furthermore, those intellectually disabled individuals who do meet the required level
of competency, and who are interested in forming sexual relationships, should be
assisted in establishing sexual relations that are beneficial to them and are not
exploitive or abusive. People with mild to moderate degrees of disability, constitute
the largest percentage among the intellectually disabled and tend to be the group
most interested in sexual relationships and parenthood. Appropriate sex education,
including information about the risks and benefits, birth control techniques as well as
parenthood information need to be provided to them. Education and training about
being able to assert yourself when unwelcome sexual advances are made, is also
crucial.
In conclusion, although people with intellectual disabilities are regarded as having
equal moral status to other persons and entitled to the same rights as other people, a
form of paternalistic protection is necessary for the more severely intellectually
disabled where the expression of sexuality by means of sexual intercourse is
concerned. This paternalistic interference should be limited to sexual expression
involving other parties and should only be reserved for those who are found to be
clearly incompetent to provide informed consent for sex.
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6.4 The intellectually disabled parent
The principle of respect for autonomy expects health care professionals to facilitate
and respect decisions made by a competent, informed person where these decisions
are made voluntarily and with understanding. In terms of reproductive issues, the
implication of this principle is that the state and other authorities have to respect
people's decisions regarding contraceptive use and parenting. For instance, the
state cannot limit the number of children a person may have, nor can parents be
prescribed as to exactly how their children should be raised. The only prerequisite
for procreative autonomy is that decisions on these matters have to be made by a
competent, autonomous person on a voluntary basis. Therefore, if a mildly
intellectually disabled woman is regarded as autonomous and competent to consent
to a sexual relationship and wants to have a child, the state and other authorities,
have to respect her autonomous decision and refrain from interfering - even though
her decision may be viewed as foolish or unwise.
As stated before, the principle of respect for autonomy only has prima facie standing.
It could be argued that if a person is regarded as incompetent to make decisions
about procreative matters, weak paternalism in order to adhere to the principle of
beneficence could be justified. People who support the involuntary sterilization of the
intellectually disabled often defend their position by appealing to the principle of
beneficence as justification for paternalistic interference. According to these
arguments, the intellectually disabled, their caregivers and society in general benefit
from their being sterilized and consequently prevented from conceiving children.
Adherence to the principle of respect for autonomy however, will refute most of these
arguments.
6.4.1 Benefits for the intellectually disabled person
Since the policies of normalization and integration have been implemented
worldwide, calls have been made for more opportunities for the intellectually disabled
to express their sexuality meaningfully. Consequently, sterilization is regarded as a
means to increased sexual freedom since it will allow the intellectually disabled to
become more fully integrated members of communities without the unnecessary
"side-effects" of pregnancy. This argument is in agreement with the idea that the
development and availability of the contraceptive pill symbolizes the emancipation of
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women - women are now regarded as free to express their sexuality without
constraints such as the risk of pregnancy. However, sexual freedom is not granted
by means of contraceptives alone. Although it provides women with freedom to
express their sexuality with less risk, sexual freedom for the intellectually disabled
woman, will only become a reality with more liberal-minded attitudes of carers, more
opportunities for relationships that are not exploitive as well as appropriate education
and knowledge regarding sexual matters (Draper, 1991:95). Furthermore,
contraceptives for women (except for the female condom) does not protect them from
HIVand other sexually transmitted infections, neither from sexual exploitation and
abuse to which they are so vulnerable. Sexual freedom presupposes a basic
understanding of what sexual intercourse entails, awareness of risks and benefits
such as pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases and HIV-infection, and the ability
to consent to or refuse sexual intercourse voluntarily. Contraceptives per se,
(including sterilization) does not guarantee this. Sexual freedom can thus only be
claimed by someone who is competent to consent to sexual intercourse with an
equally competent and willing partner. Although it is possible that many people
participate in sexual intercourse with little consideration of the potential risks and
benefits attached to it, there is a substantial difference between acting from
ignorance (whilst being competent to make autonomous decisions) and acting from a
lack of competence. Sexual relationships which are potentially exploitive or
dangerous (for instance with the risk of HIV infection), to which a person cannot
consent to due to a lack of competence, can not be regarded as beneficial to that
person, even though it may represent "sexual freedom".
Related to the argument regarding sexual freedom, is the argument that involuntary
sterilization benefit the intellectually disabled psychologically because it will save
them the trauma of pregnancy and birth - experiences that they will not be able to
understand. Underlying this argument are various assumptions such as that
pregnancy and birth are inevitably painful and traumatic, that trauma and pain should
be avoided, that trauma and pain are necessarily psychologically damaging, that
people with intellectual disabilities will not be able to deal with these experiences and
that there are no alternative forms of contraceptives available.
Pregnancy and birth can be a traumatic experience for many women - not only for
the intellectually disabled. At the same token, pregnancy and birth are not
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necessarily traumatic experiences for everyone (Draper, 1991:86). Birth experiences
can be made less dramatic and less traumatic by means of adequate pain control,
caesarian section (under full anesthesia) and the provision of information and
education as forms of preparation. However, most people will appreciate that
advance knowledge of what will happen to your body during medical interventions,
does not necessarily lessen the trauma or the pain it is experiencing. If the
prevention of trauma as a result of pregnancy and birth is the main reason provided
to sterilize someone, many more women (especially those who may struggle to
understand these experiences, such as teenagers) will have to be sterilized.
Contraceptives other than sterilization, which are less invasive and not permanent
can serve the same purpose and are also available to women with intellectual
disabilities. Furthermore, if a woman decides to become pregnant, one assumes that
she is informed of the possibility of pain and trauma that accompanies the experience
of birth.
Another problem with this argument is that it is extremely difficult to predict future
psychological harm or future psychological benefits especially where an experience
such as pregnancy and birth is concerned. Buchanan and Brock (1989:180) warn
that in determining someone's best interests, tangible factors such as medical
diagnosis or physical suffering, should be taken into account and not future emotional
or psychological harm/suffering which is difficult to determine and predict. If we want
to override someone's autonomous decisions by appealing to the principle of
beneficence, we should not claim future psychological states as the prime
consideration in claiming someone's best interest. Therefore to sterilize someone
involuntary in order to prevent some possible future psychological harm, is not
sufficient justification from the perspective of respect for autonomy.
One of the strongest arguments in favour of sterilization as the safest contraceptive
for intellectually disabled women, is that it may be harmful to use other forms of
contraception for extended periods of time. The harmful effects of the long-term use
of contraceptives, especially Depo Provera are often minimized when weighed
against the potential benefits it may have. In South Africa Depo Provera has been
used and promoted since the eighties, even though it wasn't approved for
contraceptive purposes in the USA, due to the potentially harmful effects of its long-
term use. In the South African context, it was found to be especially useful in
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governmental reproductive health programmes, since it needs to be taken only on a
3-monthly basis (especially convenient in rural areas) and human error is minimized
(in contrast with the contraceptive pili), ensuring effective population control. It is
often favoured for women with intellectual disabilities, not because of its
contraceptive qualities, but because it usually results in the cessation of
menstruation. Granted, it may provide welcome relief of pain and discomfort
associated with menstruation, but it also result in these women using Depo Provera
for much longer periods of time than women in the general population. Consequently
alternative forms of contraception are not explored, neither are alternative ways of
managing problems associated with menstruation such as the teaching of
menstruation management skills, better preparation for menarche, alternatives to
Depo Provera for the management of menstruation pain and discomfort, etc. What is
argued for is not that the use of Depo Provera be totally discontinued, but that it
should be given with discernment and only if other alternatives have been explored
and were found to be inadequate. The life-long use of Depo Provera among the
intellectually disabled should be discouraged and the fertility life of the intellectually
disabled person managed very carefully. Although some may argue that managing
menstruation hygiene is problematic for the severely-profoundly disabled the same
will be true for hygiene related to general excretion functions. This emphasizes the
need for adequate care and continuous supervision since involuntary sterilization still
does not solve the problem of menstruation management. Tubal ligation does not
result in the cessation of menses - only a hysterectomy does. Most authorities are in
agreement that hysterectomies should not be considered as a form of involuntary
sterilization, mostly because it constitutes a risky, invasive procedure with serious
reproductive implications. Finally, the harmful consequences associated with the
1ong-term use of Depo Provera still does not justify the involuntary sterilization of
women with intellectual disabilities - one wrong does not justify another.
Those who are incompetent to give consent and are sexually active, will probably
constitute a small minority, and as argued in the previous section, will mostly be in
need of paternalistic protection from sexual intercourse. For the incompetent, an
appointed surrogate can make decisions on issues such as the use of Depo Provera
(for menstruation management), whilst considering the person in question's best
interests. Sterilization as a form of contraception will serve no function for this group
of individuals and therefore becomes redundant. More often than not, the person
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who will be at risk for pregnancy, and who may require contraceptives will be the
person with mild to moderate intellectual disabilities. These individuals will more
often than not be able to give consent The intellectually disabled person who is
regarded as competent to consent to the use of contraceptives, should be given the
various options and alternatives,and be allowed to make an informed decision.
This relates to a further argument in favour of sterilizing intellectually disabled
women, stating that they (similar to other women) should also be able to enjoy the
benefits sterilization offer as a contraceptive. This option should not be excluded
from them, simply becausethey are disabled. Ideally all women should be given the
same opportunities and options for contraceptive use - also the option of sterilization.
However, sterilization is regarded as a permanent procedure that involves significant
bodily invasion. Therefore informed consent is required before this procedure can be
performed. General practice regards informed consent for this procedure as in need
of a high level of competencebecause of the complexity of the decision to be made
and because sterilization serves a preventative rather than a curative or therapeutic
function. As discussed in chapter two, many countries adopted very strict
requirements for the approval of applications for sterilization, since the end result is
of such a permanent nature. It is highly questionable that people with severe to
profound disabilities will meet the requirements for competence to consent to
sterilization, although somepeople with mild/moderate disabilities, may be competent
to give consent. In these cases sterilization should be given as an option and similar
procedures used for other women, should apply to the disabled person. The
argument that sterilization of intellectually disabled women is justified because it
respects their right to equal treatment and indirectly respect their autonomy is not an
accurate reflection of what respect for autonomy entails. The main prerequisite for
informed consent, namely competence, need to be met before autonomous decisions
can be made and be respectedas such.
From the arguments presented above, it can be concluded that there are no clear
and convincing benefits for the intellectually disabled person to be involuntarily
sterilized.
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6.4.2 Benefits for the caregivers
The benefit of sterilization is often described not only in terms of the direct benefits to
the intellectually disabled person, but also the benefit it has for the care-taker and
therefore indirectly for the person herself. In general it is argued that sterilization will
relieve the burden of care takers since they do not have additional worries about
contraceptives, pregnancy and caring for children born to the disabled. If their caring
responsibilities are eased, it is argued, it may result in better care for the person
concerned (Draper, 1991:94).
Caring for the intellectually disabled, can be a demanding and challenging task,
especially if the person cared for is unable to perform even basic self-care tasks and
is in need of constant care and supervision. The stress and demands on caregivers
will probably be less if they do not have to concern themselves with contraception,
pregnancy and support for children born to the intellectually disabled and it is
possible that it can contribute to better care. However, it is unlikely that the gain in
good care will be so significant as to justify an invasive involuntary procedure such as
sterilization. Paternalistic actions which serve to override a person's autonomy can
only be justified when these actions are for the person's own benefit - not to the
benefit of someone else, such as caregivers. Although caregivers are also granted
autonomy and their autonomy should also be respected, when they act in the
capacity of surrogates for the intellectually disabled, their main consideration should
be what is in the disabled person's best interest, not their own.
In South Africa the principles of normalization and integration, as applied to the
intellectually disabled, unfortunately did not follow so much from a concern about the
needs and wants of the disabled, but from concerns about financial and economic
matters. Since funding for state institutions have been drastically reduced over the
past few years, alternative options had to be explored, one of which is community
living - either with family members or alternative housing such as group homes. Yet
very little funding has been made available to support and develop these alternatives,
with the result that many families feel burdened by their care-taking responsibilities.
There seems to be a lack of group homes, day care facilities as well as respite care
facilities which can lessen the burden on family members. Caregivers usually have
limited accessible support and this often leads to frustration, poor care, and
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eventually neglect and abuse of the intellectually disabled. The answer to problems
about quality of care, doesn't seem to lie so much in procedures such as sterilization,
but in the availability of more resources and appropriate support for the caregivers.
Sterilization can never become a substitute for a lack of adequate care and support
for the caregivers.
6.4.3 Benefits for the child to be born
Apart from the alleged benefits sterilization may have for the intellectually disabled,
many arguments in its favour center on the avoidance of harm to the child to be born.
The intellectually disabled are regarded as incompetent to raise children since they
are not able to provide the minimal required care and stimulation that children need.
These limitations, it is argued, will result in neglect and abuse of the child and since
this will be harmful for the child, it is better for the child not to have been conceived in
the first place.
The competence of the intellectually disabled to become parents and to raise
children is a contentious issue. Although studies in general haven't found a
convincing correlation between IQ and parenting capacity, it has been suggested that
when intelligence falls below the mild range, parenting competency is seriously
questioned (Glaun & Brown, 1999:96). Relatively little research has been conducted
in terms of the intellectually disabled person's ability to parent. In a study by Glaun
and Brown (1999:95) the reasons for child protection interventions among the
intellectually disabled were analyzed and it was found that intellectually disabled
mothers tend to neglect, rather than abuse their children. A lack of parenting skills in
combination with a lack of necessary support may be crucial factors in determining
the adequacy with which these mothers care for their children. (Glaun & Brown,
1999:103-104). Most of these women were granted care under a supervision order,
also emphasizing the need for specifiC parenting support for mothers with intellectual
limitations to promote the development of their children (Keltner, Wise & Taylor,
1999:45).
According to Feldman and Case (1999:27) families with intellectually disabled
parents often possess many of the variables associated with child maltreatment such
as low educational achievement, poverty, living in substandard housing, lack of social
supports, having a history of maltreatment, depression, poor self-esteem and having
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a child with developmental delays and/or behaviour problems. However, many other
people from disadvantaged backgrounds share these variables - these are not
unique to the intellectually disabled. Feldman and Case (1999:27) also found that
parents with intellectual disabilities show a significant improvement in their parenting
skills, if they are given the opportunity to participate in parenting programmes. These
programmes can be successfully done with low cost, low tech and self-instructional
materials.
Apart from the fact that many people with intellectually disabilities can be taught
parenting skills, the variables associated with child maltreatment does not distinguish
clearly between parents with intellectual disabilities and parents from disadvantaged
backgrounds. Another related difficulty is the assessment of parenting competence -
especially because the level of minimal required care is so difficult to define and
determine (Glaun & Brown, 1999:96) and that to predict parenting competence in
persons who haven't been exposed to the demands and challenges of parenthood is
at best highly speculative. In an attempt to identify assessment criteria of parental
competence, Macklin (cited in Denekens, Nys & Stuer, 1999:238) proposed the
following:
• lack of verbal skills
• obtrusive deformation of reatity
• persistent malice towards children
• inconsistent value system
• inability to transmit essential survival information or a model for life
• failure to establish and maintain interpersonal relationships
Although these criteria may be helpful in assessing parenting competence in contexts
where a family is already in existence, it will be difficult to use these criteria as
predictive of parental competence. For example, lack of verbal skills, will exclude
people with hearing impairments or similar disabilities from parenthood, even though
many hearing impaired persons have raised children rather successfully. Many
people may behave rather antagonistically towards children which are not their own,
and still be loving and caring parents towards their own children. Macklin's criteria, if
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consistently applied, may easily serve to exclude many other prospective parents
from parenthood - people who often tum out to be adequate parents.
Current practice, in accordance with the libertarian position on procreative rights,
does not require people to qualify for parenthood in terms of their parenting
competence. If, for instance, a woman is alcohol dependent and refuses
rehabilitation, and wants to have a child, she is permitted to do so. Even though the
child may be at serious risk to develop fetal alcohol syndrome and will probably be
submitted to neglect and abuse, state intervention in the form of involuntary
sterilization is not allowed nor is the potential mother submitted to assessments
regarding parenting competence. Once the child is born and it can be shown that the
child is maltreated, then and only then is state interference justified. If we hesitate to
intervene in the general population, why should it be any different for the intellectually
disabled only because it may seem more feasible?
tt seems to be a discriminatory practice to decide a priori that a person with an
intellectual disability will not be able to care for and raise children. People with
intellectual disabilities are often capable of "good enough parenting", although they
may require more support and training opportunities than other citizens to assist
them in this process. Although some of them may struggle with the demands of
parenthood, it does not justify involuntary sterilization. If harm to the child is to be
prevented by means of sterilization, it could be argued that many people in
disadvantaged circumstances or backgrounds would have to be sterilized to prevent
harm from occurring to the child. Furthermore, it does not follow logically that it is
better for a child not to be born at all, than to be born and subjected to disadvantaged
circumstances. Life has to be worth living for the person who must live it and can not
be judged from an objective, detached point of view. Unfortunate and disadvantaged
circumstances may be harmful and may be difficult for the person subjected to it, but
it does not logically follow that the person is better off without life being conferred
upon him/her.
6.5 Conclusion
Procreative rights protect the privacy and intimacy of family life. Not only does it
regard matters of reproduction as belonging to the private realm, but it also limits
state interference to interventions where children are clearly abused or maltreated.
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In the past, intellectually disabled people were excluded from these rights, but in
recent years, normalization and integration policies have attempted to rectify these
discriminatory practices. However, it was argued that people with severe to profound
intellectual disabilities are usually incompetent to consent to sexual practices that
involve others. Therefore those people regarded as incompetent to give consent
need to be protected from sexual intercourse. Persons with intellectual disabilities,
who are competent to consent to sexual intercourse, need to receive sex education
and information regarding contraceptives, pregnancy and parenting.
The various reasons often advanced in favour of involuntary sterilization of the
intellectually disabled were analyzed from the perspective of respect for autonomy. It
can be concluded that adherence to the principle of respect for autonomy precludes
the involuntary sterilization of any person, since it does not offer clear benefits to the
person, nor prevent significant harm from occurring to that person. In agreement
with the position taken by Tënssjë (1998), it is argued that society should not
interfere in matters of procreation by means of involuntary sterilization. Interference
in procreative rights must be limited to (1) protecting those who are incompetent to
consent to sexual intercourse from sexual interactions with other beings and (2)
protecting children who are known to be maltreated or neglected from further harm.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Reflection on the impact of and range to which eugenics policies used to be practiced
in so-called liberal Westemized" countries, stimulated renewed interest in the
libertarian ideals of freedom, privacy and autonomy in matters of procreation. For
instance, Gillon (1998:219) states, "one of the morally objectionable aspects of
eugenics is its overriding of liberty and privacy by the state in an area of personal life
that is widely perceived as requiring special delicacy and respect for people's choices
about such issues as the people they love, those with whom they wish to have
children, whether and when they wish to have children, and, in more recent times, for
women's choices, once they have become pregnant, about whether or not to
continue with their pregnancies".
The libertarian position places emphasis on the requirements of freedom and
autonomy. Individuals should be granted the maximal degree of liberty in making
reproductive choices with no interference from the state or other authorities.
Autonomous actions and decisions should be respected as such (even if these are
unwise or foolish), and if decisions were made autonomously, the individual has to
take full responsibility for these decisions. In general, people's autonomous
decisions regarding contraception, having and raising children are respected and
interference only justified when children are maltreated. However, involuntary
sterilization practices made a clear distinction between the application of this
principle to the intellectually disabled and the rest of society. People with intellectual
disabilities are often considered to be globally incompetent and therefore entitled to
the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence, but not respect for autonomy.
In the present assignment it was argued that respect for autonomy is a useful
principle to apply to some people with intellectual disabilities, especially where
reproductive matters are concerned. If society supports the policies of integration,
normalization and community living for the intellectually disabled, society also
supports freedom and opportunities to express their sexuality in meaningful ways.
However, this freedom and acknowledgment of their rights, are limited in practice if it
is not accompanied by the granting of and respect for autonomous choices. This
creates the opportunity for one of two possible errors, namely (1) granting respect for
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autonomy to individuals who are clearly incompetent to make autonomous decisions
and (2) excluding people from autonomous decision-making who are in fact
competent to make their own decisions on these matters. It is especially the latter
error, which often occurred in the past and indirectly resulted in the involuntary
sterilization of thousands of individuals that has been problematic. In the foregoing
chapters it has been argued that the principle of respect for autonomy (especially in
the form of informed consent), must be applied to the intellectually disabled and that
competence can be determined for each individual with reference to the complexity
of a specific decision to be made. This process may lead to the finding that most
people with severe intellectual disabilities are unable to consent to sexual
intercourse. The risk of sexual exploitation is very real and therefore it was argued
that people who are incompetent to consent to sexual intercourse ought to be
protected and prevented from engaging in sexual activities that involve others.
Research has shown that most people with severe to profound levels of disability, are
uninterested in sexual intercourse unless introduced to it by someone else and that
most of them require continuous supervision for other daily activities as well. If good
supervision is readily available it should not be too difficult to prevent sexual
intercourse form occurring. The purpose of this paternalistic interference is not only
to prevent pregnancy from occurring, but to protect the severely intellectually
disabled from sexual exploitation, sexually transmitted infections (STI) and HIV/AIDS.
Even though a procedure such as sterilization may prevent pregnancy, it does not
prevent HIV/AIDS, STl's or dangerous sexual behaviour from occurring. If
continuous supervision is provided, involuntary sterilizations in order to prevent
pregnancy among the severely and profoundly disabled, becomes unnecessary.
People with mild to moderate intellectual disabilities, who have received the
necessary education and information, may be able to consent to sexual intercourse
and often show interest in sexual relations and having children. The reasons usually
advanced in favour of involuntary sterilization for this group of disabled people, if
considered from the perspective of autonomy, are not convincing. Therefore it is
concluded that the involuntary sterilization of any person is unacceptable if respect
for autonomy is used as the guiding principle. The severely intellectually disabled do
not require sterilization if care is taken to prevent sexual intercourse from occurring,
and the mildly disabled are mostly able to provide consent for sterilization through
normal procedures. If sterilization is regarded as a necessity to prevent highly
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inheritable forms of intellectual disabilities to occur, carriers of other genetic diseases
should also be involuntarily sterilized.
Sterilization is often used as a mechanism to compensate for other problems in the
health and social systems, such as lack of resources to support the intellectually
disabled and their caregivers, lack of education regarding reproductive and parenting
matters, inadequate training of health care workers regarding intellectual disabilities,
lack of respect for the intellectually disabled, lack of tolerance for variety of life styles,
etc. These limitations need to be addressed through means other than sterilizing the
intellectually disabled person.
The principle of respect for autonomy obligates health care professionals to actively
enhance the autonomous decision-making abilities of people with intellectuai
disabilities. In the words of Cartwright (1994:72): "some people can be helped to
make competent choices by searching for a suitable form in which to convey the
relevant information to the patient, by gently helping him to understand and explore
the implications of the various options and by displaying a sensitivity to his fears and
anxieties. A doctor may help a patient to make a decision that can be regarded as
competent when, in the absence of such resourceful assistance, the decision could
not be reasonably have been so regarded." This seems to be the challenge faced by
health care professionats.
living in a libertarian society requires sacrifices in return for the liberty it protects and
guarantees. Although it can be regarded as better in the long run to recognize a
general right to autonomy which is always respected than by reserving the right to
interfere with other people's lives whenever it is thought they have made a mistake
(Dworkin, 1993:232), this may result in being confronted with behaviours and ideas
that one may experience as offensive, unworthy, disturbing or silly. Tolerance of
others, however, is a necessary aspect of respect for autonomy. According to
Mercer (1999:320) tolerance is a virtue that needs to be cultivated by all liberals,
since respect for autonomy of rational agents is a deep part of liberalism. The
tolerant liberal is concerned that the state should not intervene to reform society
through legislation or coercive policy in restrictions of freedom of thought, dress,
speech, etc. The liberal society should also show tolerance for people with
compromised levels of functioning due to intellectual impairments and should not
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intervene unnecessarily. However, caregivers and health care professionals often
feel paralyzed by helplessness in caring for the intellectually disabled. In the words
of Campbell (1991: 111), "respecting the autonomy of patients and seeking to
enhance it are highly important moral aims for the practice of medicine, but we
must also accept that we are responded to, loved, protected by people we can trust.
We need an ethic for modem medicine which guides and sustains professionals and
relatives when confronted by helplessness - their own and that of those they care
for." There is a need to develop an "ethic for modem medicine" that serves both the
need to respect autonomy and the need to take care of people with impaired mental
functioning such as those with intellectual disabilities (Verkerk, 1999:358).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
REFERENCES
Ackerman, T.F. & Strong, C. (1989). A casebook of medical ethics. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Allen, D.F. & Allen, V.S. (1979). Ethical issues in mental retardation: tragic
choiceslliving hope. Nashville: Abingdon.
Anastasi, A. (1982). Psychological testing (5th Ed.). New York: Macmillan.
Areen, J. (1997). Limiting procreation. In RM. Veatch (Ed.), Medical Ethics (~
Ed.), pp. 103-134. London: Jones and Bartlett Publishers.
Arneson, RJ. (1979). Mill versus Paternalism. Philosophy Research Archive, 470-
489.
Beauchamp, TL & Childress, J.F. (1994). Principles of biomedical ethics. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Belliotti, RA. (1993). Sex. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics, pp. 315-326.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Blackburn, S. (1996). Oxford dictionary of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Boddington, P. & Podpadec, T. (1991). Who are the mentally handicapped? Journal
of Applied Philosophy, 8(2), 177-190.
Boddington, P. & Podpadec, T. (1992). Reply to Anstëtz: what we can learn from
people with learning difficulties. Bioethics, 6(4),361-364.
Buchanan, A.E. & Brock, D.W. (1989). Deciding for others: the ethics of surrogate
decision making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Callahan, J.C. (1998). Birth-control ethics. In Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics,
Volume 1, pp. 335-351. San Diego: Academic Press.
Campbell, A. (1991). Dependency revisited: the limits of autonomy in medical ethics.
In M. Brazier and M. Lobjoit (Eds.), Protecting the vulnerable. Autonomy and
consent in health care, pp. 101-112. London: Routledge.
Cartwright, W. (1994). The sterilisation of the mentally disabled: competence, the
right to reproduce and discrimination. In A. Grubb (Ed.), Decision-making and
problems of incompetence, pp. 67-88. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Christman, J.(Ed.) (1989). The inner citadel: essays on individual autonomy. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Davis, D & Foster, D.H. (1990). Contemporary legal aspects of mental handicap. In
S.J. Lea and D.H. Foster (Eds.), Perspectives on mental handicap in South
Africa, pp. 231-252. Durban: Butterworth.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Denekens, J.P.M., Nys, H. & Stuer, H. (1999). Sterilisation of incompetent mentally
handicapped persons: a model for decision-making. Journal of Medical
Ethics, 25, 237-241.
Dickensen, D.L. (1999). Cross-cultural issues in European bioethics. Bioethics,
13(3/4),249-255.
Draper, H. (1991). Sterilization abuse. Women and consent to treatment. In M.
Brazier and M. Lobjoit (Eds.), Protecting the vulnerable. Autonomy and
consent in health care, pp. 77-100. London: Routledge.
Drew, C.J., Logan, D.R & Hardman, M.L. (1990). Mental retardation: a life cycle
approach (4th Ed.). New York: Merrill.
Duncan, A.S., Dunstan, G.R & Welbourn, RB. (1977). Dictionary of Medical Ethics.
London: Darton, Longman & Todd.
Dworkin, G. (1988). The theory and practice of autonomy. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Dworkin, G. (1989). The concept of autonomy. In J. Christman (Ed.), The inner
citadel: essays on individual autonomy, pp. 54-62. Oxford University Press:
New York.
Dworkin, Ronald (1993). Life's dominion. London: Harper Collins.
Edgerton, RB. (1999). Foreword. Journal of Intellectual & Developmental Disability,
24(1), 1-2.
Fairbairn, G.J. (1991). Complexity and the value of lives - some philosophical
dangers for mentally handicapped people. Journal of Applied Philosophy,
8(2), 211-228.
Feinberg, J. (1989). Autonomy. In J. Christman (Ed.), The inner citadel: essays on
individual autonomy, pp. 27-53. Oxford University Press: New York.
Feldman, M.A. & Case, L. (1999). Teaching child-care and safety skills to parents
with intellectual disabilities through self-learning. Journal of Intellectual &
Developmental Disability, 24(1),27-44.
Foster, D.H. (1990). Historical and legal traces 1800-1900. In S.J. Lea and D.H.
Foster (Eds.), Perspectives on mental handicap in South Africa, pp. 21-70.
Durban: Butterworth.
Friedman, J.M. (1978). Sterilization: legal aspects. In W.l. Reich (Ed.),
Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Volume 1, pp. 1613-1618. New York: The Free
Press.
Galton, D.J. (1998). Greek theories on eugenics. Journal of Medical Ethics, 24, 263-
267.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Galton, D.J. & Galton, C.J. (1998). Francis Galton: and eugenics today. Journal of
Medical Ethics, 24, 99-105.
Gems, David. (1999). Politically correct eugenics. Theoretical Medicine and
Bioethics, 20,201-213.
Gillon, R (1998). Eugenics, contraception, abortion and ethics. Journal of Medical
Ethics, 24,219-220.
Glaun, D.E. & Brown, P.F. (1999). Motherhood, intellectual disability and child
protection: characteristics of a court sample. Journal of Intellectual &
Developmental Disability, 24(1), 95-105.
Griffen, J., Carlson, G., Taylor M. & Wilson, J. (1994). An introduction to menstrual
management for women who have an intellectual disability and high support
needs. International Journal of Disability, Development and Education, 41(2),
103-116.
Harris, J. (1983). Making up her mind: consent, pregnancy and mental handicap:
Commentary 2. Joumal of Medical Ethics, 9,219-226.
Harris, J. (1985). The value of life: an introduction to medical ethics. london:
Routledqe.
Harris, J. (1985). The value of life: an introduction to medical ethics. london:
Routledge.
Hellman, l.M. (1978). Sterilization: medical aspects. In W.T. Reich (Ed.),
Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Volume 1, pp. 1606-1609, New York: The Free
Press.
Hill, T.F. (1991). The Kantian conception of autonomy. In J. Christman (Ed.), The
inner
citadel: essays on individual autonomy, pp. 91-108, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Holm, S. (1998). Autonomy. In Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, Volume 1, pp. 267-
274. San Diego: Academic Press.
Hubbard, R & Henifin, M.S. (1984). Genetic screening of prospective parents and of
workers. Some scientific and social issues. In J.M. Huber & RT. Almeder
(Eds.), Biomedical Ethics Reviews, pp. 73-120. Clifton, NJ: Humana Press.
Husak, D.N. (1980). Paternalism and autonomy. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 10(1),
26-46.
Kaplan, H.1. & Sadock, B.J. (1988). Synopsis of Psychiatry, 6th Ed., Baltimore:
Williams & Wilkins.
Kaplan, H.I., Sadock, B.J. & Grebb, J.A. (1994). Synopsis of Psychiatry, rh Ed.,
Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Keltner, BR., Wise, L.A. & Taylor, G. (1999). Mothers with intellectual limitation and
their 2-year old children's developmental outcomes. Journal of Intellectual &
Developmental Disability, 24(1),45-57.
Knight, J.W. (1998). Birth-control technology. In Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics,
Volume 1, pp. 353-368. San Diego: Academic Press.
Kopelman, L. (1982). Respect and the retarded: issues of valuing and labeling. In L.
Kopelman and J.C. Moskop (Eds), Ethics and mental retardation, pp. 65-86.
Dordrecht: D. Reidel publishing company.
Lafollette, H. (1999). Circumscribed autonomy: children, care and custody. In U.
Narayan & J.J. Bartkowiak (Eds.), Having and raising children:
unconventional families, hard choices and the social good, pp. 137-151.
University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Lappé, M. (1978). Eugenics: ethical issues. In W.l. Reich (Ed.), Encyclopedia of
Bioethics, Volume 1, pp. 462-468, New York: The Free Press.
Lea, S.J. & Foster, D.H. (Eds.) (1990). Themes, theories and thistles in mental
handicap: an introduction. In S.J. Lea and D.H. Foster (Eds.), Perspectives
on mental handicap in South Africa, pp 1-20. Durban: Butterworth.
Margolis, J. (1984). Applying moral theory to the retarded. In L. Kopelman and J.C.
Moskop (Eds.), Ethics and mental retardation, pp. 19-36. Dordrecht: D.
Reidel Publishing Company.
Mercer, M. (1999). Grounds of liberal tolerance. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 33,
319-334.
Mill, J.S. (1996). On Liberty and the subjection of women. Hertforshire: Wordsworth
Editions Limited.
Mittler, P. (1991). Competence and consent in people with mental handicap. In M.
Brazier and M. Lobjoit (Eds.), Protecting the vulnerable: autonomy and
consent in health care, pp. 22-76. London: Routledge.
Molteno, C. (1997). Beyond "mental handicap". In D. Foster, M. Freeman and Y.
Pillay (Eds.), Mental Health Policy Issues for South Africa, Pinelands: MASA
Multimedia Publications.
Moon, J.D. (1998). Communitarianism. In Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, Volume
1, pp. 551-561. San Diego: Academic Press.
Mori, M. (1997). Is the human embryo a person? No. In D.Evans (Ed.), Conceiving
the embryo. Ethics law and practice in human embryology, pp. 151-163. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Murphy, J.G. (1984). Rights and borderline cases. In Kopelman and JC Moskop
(Eds.), Ethics and mental retardation, pp. 3-18. Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Publishing Company.
Nash, E.S. & Navias, M. (1992). The therapeutic sterilisation of the mentally
handicapped. Experience with the Abortion and Sterilisation Act of 1975.
South African Medical Journal, 82(6),437-440.
Noonan, J.T. (1978). Contraception. In W.T. Reich (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics,
Volume 1, pp. 204-215. New York: The Free Press.
Norman, R. (1983). The moral philosophers: an introduction to ethics. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
O'Neill, O. (1993). Kantian ethics. In P. Singer (Ed.), A Companion to ethics, pp.
175-185. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.
Park, D.C. & Radford, J.P. (1998). From the case files: reconstructing a history of
involuntary sterilisation. Disability & Society, 13(3),317-342.
Przyluska-Fiszer, A. (1997). Human embryology and the criterion of moral standing:
some philosophical and ethical problems. In D. Evans (Ed.), Conceiving the
embryo. Ethics law and practice in human embryology, pp. 165-172. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Reilly, P.R. (1996). A look back at eugenics. Gene/etter, 1(3), 1-5.
Richards,D.A.J. (1981). Rights and autonomy. Ethics, 92,3-20.
Roelofse, M. & Kleintjes, S. (1995). Ability to give informed consent in persons with
profound to mild mental retardation. Unpublished Research Project,
Alexandera Hospital, Cape Town.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1982). Mental Retardation and society: the ethics and politics of
normalization. Ethics, 94,81-101.
Schneewind, J.B. (1993). Modern moral philosophy, In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion
to ethics, pp. 147-160. Oxford: Blackwell publishers.
Schoeman, F. (1980). Rights of children, rights of parents and the moral basis of the
family. Ethics, 91,6-19.
Secker, B. (1999). The appearance of Kant's deontology in contemporary
kantianism: concepts of patient autonomy in bioethics. Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy, 24(1),43-66.
Sherwin, S. (1992). No longer patient: feminist ethics and health care. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Smith, J.D. & PolIoway, E.A. (1993). Institutionalization, involuntary sterilization, and
mental retardation: profiles from the history of the practice. Mental
Retardation, 31(4),208-214.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Spieker, P. (1990). Mental handicap and citizenship. Journal of Applied Philosophy,
7(2),139-151.
Strauss, S.A (1995). Sterilisasie van geestesonbevoegde persone: In kort oorsig
van regsontwikkelinge. SA Practice Management, 16(1), 10-11.
Strong, C. (1979). Informed consent: theory and policy. Journal of Medical Ethics, 5,
196-199.
Taylor, M. & Carlson, G. (1993). The legal trends - implications for
menstruationl fertility management for young women who have an intellectual
disability. International Journal of Disability, Development and Education,
40(2), 133-157.
Tannsjo, T. (1998). Compulsory sterilisation in Sweden. Bioethics, 12(3),236-249.
Tannsjë, T. (1999). Coercive care. The ethics of choice in health and medicine.
London: Routledge.
Tong, R (1993). Feminine and feminist ethics. Belmont: Wadsworth Company.
Ulrich, L.P. (1976). Reproductive rights and genetic disease. In J.M. Humber & RF.
Almeder (Eds.), Biomedical ethics and the law, pp. 351-360. New York:
Plenum
Press.
Van Melsen, AG.M. (1978). Person. In W.l. Reich (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics,
pp. 1206-1210. New York: The Free Press.
Veatch, RM. (1997). Medical ethics (2nd Ed.). Boston: Jones & Bartlett Publishers.
Venter, A (1993). Aspects of cross-cultural testing. Southern African Journal of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 5(1), 34-37.
Verkerk, M. (1999). A care perspective on coercion and autonomy. Bioethics,
13(3/4),358-368.
Warren, M.A (1993). Abortion. In P. Singer (Ed.), A Companion to ethics pp. 303-
314. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wigton, A, Adnams, C. & King, M.S. (1997). Child mental handicap: related policies
in the new South Africa. Southern African Journal of Child and Adolescent
Mental Health, 9(1), 44-56.
Woozley, AD. (1984). The rights of the retarded. In L. Kopelman and J.C. Moskop
(Eds.), Ethics and mental retardation, pp. 47-56. Dordrecht: D. Reidel
publishing company.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Appendix A
THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY
RETARDED PERSONS, 1971 (Allen & Allen, 1979:151)
1. The mentally retarded person has, to the maximum degree of feasibility, the
same rights as other human beings.
2. The mentally retarded person has a right to proper medical care and physical
therapy and to such education, training, rehabilitation and guidance as will
enable him to develop his ability and maximum potential.
3. The mentally retarded person has a right to economic security and to a
decent standard of living. He has a right to perform productive work or to
engage in any other meaningful occupation to the fullest extent of his
capabilities.
4. Whenever possible, the mentally retarded person should live with his own
family or with foster parents and participate in different forms of community
life. The family with which he lives should receive assistance. If care in an
institution becomes necessary, it should be provided in surroundings and
other circumstances as close as possible to those of normal life.
5. The mentally retarded person has a right to a qualified guardian when this is
required to protect his personal well-being and interests.
6. The mentally retarded person has a right to protection from exploitation,
abuse and degrading treatment. If prosecuted for any offense, he shall have
a right to due process of law with full recognition being given to his degree of
mental responsibility
7. Whenever mentally retarded persons are unable, because of the severity of
their handicap, to exercise all their rights in a meaningful way or it should
become necessary to restrict or deny some or all of these rights, the
procedure used for that restriction or denial of rights must contain proper legal
safeguards against any from of abuse. This procedure must be based on an
evaluation of the social capability of the mentally retarded person by qualified
experts and must be subject to periodic review and to the right of appeal to
higher authorities.
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